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PREFACE 
John Rawls' principal aim in A Theory of Justice 1 
is to explicate a moral theory, justice as fairness, based 
on an interpretation of the social contract, which offers 
a substantial alternative to utilitarian thought in general. 
Rawls concentrates on justice because, in his opinion, it is 
the most important virtue of the arrangement of the basic 
structure of society. Two main principles, namely, (1) the 
principle of liberty and (2) the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle, are the prime 
constituents of Rawls' special or ideal conception of 
justice. 
I intend to discuss the content .and the ordering of 
the main principles from the perspective of those formulating 
them. There are five parts to my analys'is. In Chapter One 
the main themes and the overall plan of A Theory of Justice 
are described. Chapter Two is devoted to a discussion of 
the original position which is the starting point of Rawls' 
theory. The principle of liberty, and its priority, are 
the subject of Chapter Three. Chapter Four focuses on 
both the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle, the relation between these principles, 
and the relation between each part of the second principle 
and the principle of liberty. Finally, in Chapter Five, 
the conclusions of the previous chapters will enable me to 
comment on the suitability of these principles as the 
standard of a just society. I shall also indicate two 
iii 
problems to be overcome before any society can be assessed 
in terms of this standard. 
When examining Rawls' arguments for the principles 
of justice, I shall, at times, combine philosophical 
criticisms with political objections. Some philosophers 
2 in particular, might object to this method. However, 
this is the method that Rawls himself uses, since 11 • • the 
soundness of the theory of justice· is shown as much in its 
consequences as in the prima facie acceptability of its 
premises." 3 Brian Barry lends credence to this view, for 
he comments that 11 • • in choosing· principles to apply 
to a society one has to ·look at the implication of any 
given principle for the society, and ask whether one prefers 
to have a society in accord with this principle or some 
4 alternative." In order to come to terms with Rawls on his 
own ground it is often necessary to follow the methods he 
uses, even if it does necessitate treading on some philos-
ophers' toes. 
NOTES 
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). 
2. See, for example, Alan R. White, review of Contemporary 
British Philo~ophy (Fourth Series) edit~d by H.D. Lewis 
in 'the Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (April, 1977), p. 182. 
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. ~5· 
iv 
· ... ' . 
NOTES {Cont'd) 
4. Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 121. 
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THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF RAWLS' ARGUMENT 
The most important subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society. All major social, economic and 
political institutions are the constitutive elements of 
such a structure. These institutions determine a person's 
rights and duties, as well as his share of economic and 
social benefits. Whether one is poor or wealthy, illiterate 
or. educated, depends to some extent on the nature and 
arrangement of the basic structure of one's society. And 
this is where unfairness can occur. Institutions may be 
organized so that a person, who has spent his formative 
years in poverty-stricken surroundings, is likely· to face 
the prospect of a rudimentary education followed by limited 
opportunities of employment. Examples like this should be 
the exception rather than the rule. We can only eradicate 
the most fundamental forms of injustice by directing our 
attention to the basic structure of society. In his most 
recent article, Rawls comments: 
The role of the basic structure is to secure just 
background conditions against which the actions of 
individuals and associations take place. Unless 
this structure is appropriately regulated and 
corrected, the social process will cease to be 
just, however free and fair particular transactions 
may look when viewed by themselves. 1 
The immediate problem, and one of the principal 
aims of A Theory of Justice, is to formulate principles of 
justice to determine how the major institutions of a society 
1 
2. 
can best be arranged in a single system that is just. 
Rawls uses a social contract as the heuristic device for 
choosing these principles. Members of society are placed in 
an hypothetical situation where they have to agree in advance 
to the arrangement of their basic structure. Rawls fully 
explains his intentions as follows: 
Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in 
social cooperation choose together, in one joint 
act, the principles which are to assign basic 
rights and duties and to determine the division of 
social benefits. Men are to decide in advance 
how they are to regulate their claims against one 
another and what is to be the foundation charter 
of their society.2 
An initial situation needs to be created where-
by all members of society have an equal chance to influence 
the choice of principles of justice. For Rawls, justice as 
fairness means that the appropriate principles are selected 
in an initial situation that is fair. This situation is the 
original position. All those in the original position are 
treated equally as moral persons; that is, as persons who 
have both a conception of the good (their pLan of life), 
as well as the capability to choose principles of justice 
and to adhere to the~. Persons placed in this hypothetical 
situation are described variously as individuals (but not 
'isolated' individu~ls), r~tional agents, heads of families 
. 
and heads of generic lines. I shall discuss what Rawls 
means by these terms at a later stage in this chapter. 
In my account, I shall refer to those in the original position 
as 'negotiators·~ • 
Although the negotiators may be equal as moral persons. 
J 
in the original position, they might differ in many other 
ways; for example, intelligence, ability, income, wealth, 
status, class and race. Now factors like these cannot be 
allowed to influence the choice of principles of justice. 
Whether a person is intelligent or not is neither just nor 
unjust. It is a natural fact. But injustice can occur if 
institutions pay undue attent'ion to such facts. An aristocracy 
is unjust because the circumstances of a person's birth, a 
natural fact, are made an ascriptive basis for belonging to 
the privil~ged class. Furthermore, if a ne~otiator is well 
aware of his own strong and weak points, he is very likely 
to select principles of justice that play to his strengths 
and diminish his weaknesses. To obviate differences of 
natural fortune and social circumstances, negotiators are 
placed behind a 'veil of ignorance'. Certain kinds of 
information are disallowed. A negotiator knows nothing about 
himself, (or others), including the details of his plan of 
life and the generation to which he belongs. In addition, 
he is unaware of the particular facts of all societies; 
for example, their stages of economic development, geographical 
characteristics and types of poli t.ical culture. But 
negotiators have access to any general law or theory, .and on 
the basis o~ this information alone, they are to formulate 
principles of justice for society. The veil of ignorance 
ensures that all negotiators are equally disadvantaged. 
This is the Archimedean viewpoint: any individual of any 
generation in every society can become an hypothetical 
negotiator in the original position by accepting the 
4. 
conditions of the veil of ignorance. 
In addition to limits on information, Rawls makes a 
number of assumptions about the negotiators: 
(a) They know that circumstances of justice prevail in 
their society: there is a need for regulatory principles, 
since members of society do not all have the same conception 
of justice. Moreover, everyone is likely to accept the form-
ulated principles. 
(b) Although a negotiator is trying to advance his plan 
of life without any concern for the life-expectations of his 
contemporaries (in Rawls' terms,·negotiators are 'mutually 
disinterested'), he does consider the interests of at least 
one other person in a succeeding generation. This is why 
Rawls refers to the negotiators as heads of either families 
or generic lines, or as 'continuirig strands'. 
(c) The negotiators are capable of a sense of justice; 
that is, once the principles have been chosen, ~nd accepted 
by all members of a society, each person can depend on him-
self and others to abide by them. 
(d) A negotiator is assumed to not envy others who turn 
out to have a higher index of primary goods than himself, 
provided the difference between his index and others is 
neither too great nor attained by unjust means. 
(e) In selecting principles of justice, a negotiator 
will try to advance his plan of life as best he can. One 
of the conditions of the veil of ignorance is that a 
negotiator has no idea of the content of his plan of life. 
But he does know of the existence of primary goods. Rights, 
5. 
liberties, opportunities, income and wealth are examples of 
social primary goods. Health, intelligence, vigour and 
imagination are regarded as instances of natural primary goods~ 
The basic structure is mainly concerned with social primary 
goods. Irrespective of his plan of life, a negotiator will 
need primary goods, either social or natural, or both. Not 
all primary goods will be of the same importance to everyone. 
To avoid comparisons of various goods, they are assumed to 
form an index. As a negotiator is assumed to prefer more 
rather than less of these goods, he can best promote his 
plan of life by trying to obtain as high an index of primary 
goods as possible. 
The single-minded pursuit of a plan of life is the 
reason why Rawls refers to his negotiators as 'rational' 
agents. For Rawls, 'rational' means taking the most effective 
means to given ends. We have just observed that this is 
what a negotiator tries to·do when he aims to secur~ his 
conception of the good, whatever it might be. The deliberation 
about a conception of the good in terms of primary goods, and 
in the absence of any additional particular information, is 
what Rawls calls the 'thin theory of the good'. 
Having outlined the conditions of the original 
position, we are now able to discuss the choice of principles 
of justice. Three different sets of principles can be selected. 
After deciding on principles of jcistice for institutions, 
negotiators can then proceed to choose principles for 
individuals as well as for laws of nations, together with 
priority rules for regulating the different sets of principles. 
• 
6 
However, Rawls confines his discussion to a selection of 
principl~s for institutions of society. For these purposes, 
a society is assumed to be a closed system, isolated from 
other societies. In addition, we are concerned with choosing 
principles of justice for a well-ordered society; that is, 
everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in 
upholding just institutions. Rawls refers to this as 'strict 
compliance theory'. In later articles, Rawls also assumes 
that everyone has normal physic~!· needs, so that there are 
no problems about special health care. 3 
The negotiators also take account of the formal 
constraints of the conc~pt of right. Principles of dustice 
have to be formulated in a certain way if 'they are to be 
adequate ethical principYes. Rawls summarizes these con-
ditions as follows: 11 • a conception of right is a set of 
principles, general in form and universal in application, that 
is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal 
for · ordering the conflicting aims of moral per~ons. 11 4: 
In their attempt to formulate principles of justice, 
negotiators compare various conceptions of justice on the 
basis of general information at their disposal. The range 
of alternatives is enormous for, in theory, those in the 
original position can consider any conception of justice. 
But Rawls mostly compares his theory to various interp-
retations of the ~tility principle, although intuitionism, 
perfectionism and egoism are also discussed. 
At a first glance, a negotiator in the original 
position can best advance his index of primary goods, and 
7. 
be assured he is no worse off than anyone else, by selecting 
the following egalitarian principle: all members of society 
are to receive the same index of primary goods. Furthermore, 
this index must be as high as possible. This is the'bench-
mark of equality'. But a negotiator might not be content 
with this principle. An inequality of primary goods could 
be advantageous to all if' :, for example' it resulted in 
increased economic growth accompanied by greater proi:;perity. 
and employment. In sanctioning inequalities, how'ever, the 
negotiator must be careful, since he is unawa~e of the partic-
ulars of his own situation. Once the veil of ignorance is 
removed, he might well find himself in unfortunate circ-
umstances. To allow for this, those in the original position 
formulate the following principle: 
All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, 
income and we.al th, and the bases of self-respect -
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the 
advantage of the least favored.5 
This is Rawls' general theory of justice. It is devised on 
the basis of the maximin principle; that is, the minimum is 
maximized. The negotiator formulates the principle from the 
perspective of the least advantaged representative man (in 
other words, a person who is representative of the least 
advantaged group}. 
All members of a society might rest assured in the 
knowledge that, irrespective of their place in the socio-
economic hierarchy, they have a certain minimum df food, 
clothing, shelter and income or wealth. Such a society 
... 
8 
is said to be in favourable circumstances. In this case, a 
negotiator draws a broad distinction between the primary 
goods associated with civil and political liberties, and 
those concerned with social and economic factors. Since 
great importance is attached to the primary good of self-
respect, the protection of liberties takes precedence over 
all other goods. The least advantaged representative man 
is no longer willing to accept a lesser liberty for an 
increase in wealth. The negotiators express the principles 
of justice for .a well-ordered society in favourable circ-
umstances as follows: 
First Principle. 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
[principle of liberty] 
Second Principle. 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consist~nt with the just savings principle [difference 
principle) , and · 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity 
(principle of fair equality of opportunit~ • 
This is Rawls' ideal or special theory of justice. Unless 
stated to the contrary, my. discussion is confined to the 
ideal theory. 
The principles of justice are ranked in a lexical 
or serial order. That is to say, a second principle cannot 
come into operation before the first has been implemented, a 
third cannot be applied prior to the second, and so on. In 
Rawls' theory, the principle of liberty is ranked prior to 
both the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
9 
difference principle. Furthermore, the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity takes priority over the difference 
principle. 
The main difference between the general and ideal 
theories of justice is that liberty is absolutely prior to 
all other primary goods in the latter, whilst in the former it 
can be traded-off for other goods. But the tendency of the 
general theory is to aim for favourable circumstances in 
society to eventually permit the establishment of lexically 
ordered principles. A reduction of liberty, at the expense 
of economic and social advantages in the general theory, 
will only be tolerated if it is a necessary step on the road 
to achieving these minimum conditions. The general theory 
of justice is the special one in embryo. 
Two points should be mentioneQ at this stage. First, 
in Rawls! theory (both general and ideal), 'right' is prior to 
'good'. Negotiators, behind the veil of ignorance, act on the 
basis of the thin theory of the good to decide on the arrange-
ment of the primary subject of justice, the basic structure 
of society. For this reason, Rawls classifies justice as 
fairness as non-teleological or deontological. He adds that 
• deontological theories are define~ as non-
teleological ·ones, not as views that characterize the 
rightn~ss of institutions and acts indepetidently from 
their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth our 
attention take consequences into account in judging 
rightness. 7 · 
In teleological theories (for example, utilitarianism) the 
right is that which maximizes the good. This is not the 
case in justice as fairness, and so, in Rawls' opinion, here 
10 
is one fundamental difference between his contract theory and 
utilitarianism. 
The second point concerns the role of pure procedural 
justice. All are treated equally as moral persons in the 
original position. Principles of justice are chosen in an 
initial situation that is fair; consequently, the principles 
themselves will be fair. There are no independent criteria 
for deciding whether or not the best principles have been 
chosen. Alternatively, II there is a correct or fair 
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, 
whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been prop-
erly followed. • A fair procedure translates its fairness 
to the outcome only when it is actually carried out •. 11' •.8 · In 
Rawls' terms, the principles of justice are fair because they 
are the result of a fair procedure. We can summarize this 
procedure by saying that negotiators, behind the veil of 
ignorance in the original position, decide on s~ch principles 
by assessing various conceptions of justice in a rational 
manner. 
Once negotiators have chosen principles for the 
basic structure, they can consider how to apply the ideal 
conception of justice to a society. All in all, there is 
a four stage s~quen~e: (1) principles of justice, (2) constitu-
tional convention, (3) legislative assembly and (4) adjudica-
tion and administration. Rawls emphasi~es that this proced-
ure is part of the theory of justice. It is neither an 
account of a political system nor a description of how 
institutions actually operate. The institutions of some 
11 
form of constitutional democracy are assumed. No significance 
is attached to this, for any set of institutions complying 
with the requirements of both the two principles of justice, 
and any further relevant stages, will be just. 
The negotiators now move to the second stage, the 
constitutional convention. They have to draft a constitution 
specifying the role ~f major governmental institutions, as 
well as ensuring the protection of everyone's civil and 
political liberties. The constitution safeguards what was 
guaranteed by the principle of liberty. Consequently, 
delegates to the convention are constrained by the two 
principles of justice, which act as an independent standard 
in assessing proposed schemes. The veil of ignorance is 
partially lifted to admit relevant information. In addition 
to knowing general laws and theories, the negotiators have 
access to the general facts of their society; for example, 
its natural circumstances and resources, level of economic 
development and political culture. 
At the third stage, the legislative assembly, the 
justice of laws and policies is assessed. The formulation 
of statutes has to conform to the requirements of both the 
principles of justice and the constitutional convention. 
The second principle of justice is the focus of attention. 
Legislation is mainly concerned with promoting the interests 
of the least advantaged members of society. The protection 
of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
regulation of social and economic policy are the central 
problems of this stage. To enable these tasks to be carried 
12 
out, the veil of ignorance is largely removed to permit the 
negotiators to know the full range of general economic and 
social facts about their society. 
The fourth and final stage is the application of 
rules to particular cases by judges and administrators. 
All constraints of the previous thr~e stages apply. Since 
the principles of justice have been applied to all aspects 
of the basic structure, there is no necessity for the veil 
of ignorance. Everyone has access to all facts. Full 
information is required if we are td adjudicate disputes 
about the application or transgression of rules and regulations, 
by individuals. Individuals more than institut~ons are the 
·subject of the final stage. I have already mentioned that 
justice as fairness is worked out on the basis of strict 
compliance theory. But in cases where persons do not do 
their part in upholding just institutions, partial compli-
ance theory (for example, a theory of punishment) is 
required. Although Rawls does consider some of these 
problems, I shall not discuss them here, since my arialysis 
is confined to his strict compliance theory, and in partic-
ular with the first stage, the selection of principles of 
justice. 
NOTES. 
1. John Rawls, "The Basic Structure as Subject " American 
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"Reply to Alexander and Musgrave," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LXXXVIII (November, 1974), pp. 6J9-64o. 
4. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 1J5. 
5. Ibid., p. JOJ. 
6. Ibid. , p • JO 2. 
7. Ibid., p. JO. 
8. Ibid., p. 86. 
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CHAPTER ITWO 
THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
The derivation of the principles of justice depends 
on the conditions and requirements of the original position. 
The fairness of the principles is subject to the fairness 
of the procedure in pure procedural justice. In Rawls.' 
theory, the pro~edure is established by the original 
position. If there is something amiss with the interpretation 
of this initial situation, the argument for justice as 
fairness collapses. Consequently, the original position 
plays a crucial role in Rawls' argument. We need to examine 
both conditions (limits on knowledge) and requirements 
(motivational assumptions) to assess the appropriateness of 
the original position. 
Limits on Knowledge. 
In the previous chapter, we observed how the type 
of information made available to negotiators behind the veil 
of ignorance is strictly regulated, particularly when 
principles of justice are being chosen. Two broad categories 
of knowledge are unavailable in the original position; 
first, the negotiator's knowledge of his own situation 
(natural facts and social circumstances), as well as those 
of others, and secondly, facts about all societies, including 
the one in which he lives. 
The omission of natural facts means that a negotiator 
is unaware of his abilities, skills, 1ntelligence, psycho-
14 
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logical propensities (for instance, whether he is cautious 
or foolhardy), and so on. Not permitting information about 
social circumstances rules out any consideration of a 
negotiator's economic standing, social status, as well as 
the details of his plan of life. According to the restrict-
ions of the second category, the social, economic and 
political structure and development of any society remain 
unknown, as does the stage of civilization and culture that 
has been attained. In addition, 11 • the course of history 
is closed to {the negotiatorsJ,;they have no information 
about how often society has taken this or that form, or 
which kinds of societies presently exist. 11 1,_ If the course 
of history remains closed to the negotiator, and if he is 
unaware of his own circumstances, then he does not know 
to which generation he belongs. David Richards comments 
that the negotiators are denied access to all this knowledge 
because 11 • the choice of moral principles by definition 
implies that the choice is made without favouritism to 
one's class or race, clan or caste, 
2 
talent or nationality. 11 
We can now consider what information is available 
in the original position. Rawls comments: 
As far as possible, then, the only particular 
facts which the parties know is that their society 
is subject to the circumstances of justice and 
whatever this implies. It is taken for granted, 
however, that they know the general facts about 
human society. They understand political affairs 
and the principles of economic theory; they know 
the basis of social organization and the laws of 
human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed 
to know whatever general facts affect the choice 
of the principles of justice. There are no 
limitations on general information, that is, on 
general laws and theories • • 3 
Do the negotiators have sufficient information to enable 
them to compare various conceptions of justice and to 
choose principles for the basic' structure? There seems 
to be uncertainty about the kind of permissible knowledge 
in the original position, despite the clarity of the view 
expressed above. In the above passage, Rawls is adamant 
that the only particular fact known to the negotiators, 
is that the circumstances of justice obtain. (I shall 
r2turn to this fact later on in the present chapter.) 
All other particular details remain hnknown. I shall 
attempt to explicate another class of particulari;;, apart 
from the one specified by Rawls, which is allowable in 
the original position. This further class does not 
introduce any unfairness: on the contrary, it is instrumen-
tal in countering some criticisms of the veil of ignorance. 
The additional class of particulars can best be 
explained by considering the following statements: 
(1a) I am greedy 
(1b) You are greedy 
(1c) He, she is greedy, they are greedy 
(2) Someone is greedy 
(J) Some people are greedy 
(q) Many people are greedy 
(5) All people are greedy 
Each of the above statements offers some sort of information. 
Only their subjects differ. Would the knowledge conveyed 
by any of these statements be available to those in the 
17 
original position? (1a) would be excluded immediately, 
since the negotiator must remain unaware of his special 
psychological propensities. (1b) and (1c) are also ruled 
out because they identify specifi~ individuals. This is 
not permitted to prevent the possibility of formulating 
principles of justice in favour of some individuals at 
the expense of others. The information denoted by statements 
( 3), ( 4) and ( 5) is open to negotiators, for each of these 
statements is general in form ( that is, each has a plural 
subject) and does not identify specific individuals. The 
class of general facts and theories differ in degree of 
generality. In this case the order of generality is (5)) 
(4))(3). But the variation in degree provides no obstacle 
to their all being available behind the veil of ignorance. 
Rawls states this clearly in the latter portion of the 
previously quoted passage: "There are no limitations on 
general information, that is, on general laws and theories 
II 4 
We can now return to statement (2). It is a 
singular fact, since its subject is singular, but it is 
unlike (1)*, for it does not identify any one particular 
individual. Furthermore, it is completely unlike the one 
allowable particul~r fact~ that is, whether circumstances 
of justice are present or absent in a society. The class 
of particulars, typified by statement ( 2), is not consid-
ered in Rawls' theory and we have to decide if it is 
* ( 1) refers to (ta)·, ( 1b) and. ( 1c) • 
18 
allowable in the original position. As (1) refers to 
specific or identifiable individuals, I shall refer to this 
class as 'personalized particulars'. Type (2) statements 
are particular in form, although they do not identify 
specific individuals: this class will be referred to-as 
'hypothetical particulars'. 
In order to see why certain types of knowledge 
are available in the original position, and others are not, 
it is necessary to recall the rationale for the veil of 
ignorance. Rawls says the veil 
• • • ensures that no one is advantaged or dis-
advantaged in the choice of principles by the 
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of 
social circumstances. Since all are similarly 
situated and no one is able to design principles 
to favor his particular condition, the principles 
of justice are the result of a fair agreement 
or bargain. 5 
The class of hypothetical particulars ~ould not enable the 
negotiators to shape the principles of justice to their 
advantage, since these particulars neither identify certain 
specific individuals nor refer to facts which would.only 
benefit particular individuals. To say that 'someone is 
hungry' is more speculat~ve'than factual; a negotiator 
does not know who is hungry, let alone that he is exper-
iencing tell tale pangs. Instead of stating that a nego-
tiator only knows general la~s and theories together with 
an awareness of the circumstances of justice, we can say 
that he is entitled to any information, if it does not 
thereby enable him to choose principles in accordance with 
his own particular circumstances. There is evidence for 
this view in A Theory of Justice. Rawls comments that 
II • any knowledge that is likely to give rise to bias 
and distortion and to set men against one another is ruled 
out. 11 6 When speaking of the negotiators at the stage of 
the constitutional convention, he says that "{pJrovided 
they have no information about particular individuals 
including themselves, the idea of the original position is 
not affected." 7 As we have seen, hypothetical partic-
·ulars meet these requirements. Consequently, there is no 
reason to exclude them from the range of information 
possessed by the negotiators in the original position. 
A discussion of particular and general facts, as 
well as theories, need not only refer to individuals, but 
can also be extended to societies. Consider the following: 
(1) South Africa is a heterogeneous society. 
(2) There is a heterogeneous society. 
(3) Some societies are heterogeneous. 
(4) Many societies are heterogeneous. 
(5) All societies are heterogeneous. 
Information distinguishing one society from another is 
inadmissible in the original position to prevent nego-
tiators favouring particular societies. (1) is therefore 
ruled out, since it refers to a specific society. (3)' (4) 
and (5) are general social theories in one form or ariother 
that constitute the bulk of the negotiator's knowledge. 
Unlike (1), (2) does not identify any one society. It 
only refers to a type of society. However, the negotiator 
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has little reason to favour heterogeneous societies to the 
detriment of others, for he knows nothing about his society. 
Therefore the negotiator is quite entitled to make use of 
the information conveyed by (2), an hypothetical partic-
ular. 
We can now turn our attention to some of the crit-
icisms levelled against the limits on knowledge. Schaeffer 
has argued that knowledge of particular facts, and general 
facts and theories, go hand in hand. Furthermore, partic-
ular facts should be made available in the original position, 
since they form an essential part of the understanding of 
general theories. As Schaeffer puts it: 
Can humans possess any general knowledge without 
having or at least developed this knowledge from 
the study of particulars (a study in which the 
participants in the original position are 
prevented from engaging)? One cannot, for in-
stance, have learned any laws of human psychology 
while remaining entirely ignorant of one's own 
psychology. But how, having derived one's knowledge 
from the awareness of particularsj can one forget 
the latter in order to simHlate the deliber~tions 
of the original position? 
In the majority of cases, general theories are 
based on the study of particular facts. Most general 
theories are explanatory (in addition, some are predictive) 
and the explanations are directly related to the classifica-
tion, or grouping, of particular facts. Let us consider 
an example. The statement, 'he is hungry', is a partic-
ular fact. On the basis of observing several other instances 
of similar facts ('a' is hungry, 'b' is hungry, and so on), 
we both simplify and classify these occurrences by way of 
the general statement, 'some people are hungry'. The 
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general statement embraces all particular facts of the same 
kind that have occurred, are present, and will take place 
in the future. 
Schaeffer, in his psychology example above, suggests 
knowledge of general theories to be directly related to an 
individual's knowledge; that is, an understanding of the 
general statement, 'some people are hungry', depends, in 
part, on the observation, 'I am hungry' (or' I have been 
hungry'). The ability to apply a theory to one's own partic-
ular case can help one to understand it, but such applica-
tions are not an indispensable part of comprehending 
general facts and theories. It is even very difficult to 
apply some theories in this way. Some may be entirely 
foreign to an individual's experience. The capacity to 
understand principles of economic theory, mathematical 
theorems, or the kinship pattern of a foreign tribe, is not 
hindered by, and does not depend on, an individual's 
personal experience. Therefore there is no reason why the 
negotiators will not be able to understand general facts 
and theories, even though they cannot use personalized 
particulars. 
Those in the original position must be able to 
assess ~he consequences of choosing various principles of 
justice and to rank principles in order of preference. ·The 
general theories have to be applied to hypothetical situa-
tions so that the possible outcome of implementing any 
theory can be evaluated. Certain particular facts have to 
be available in the original position if any such compa-
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risons and assessments are to be made at all. For instance, 
negotiators can compare the principle of utility with a 
maximin principle by analyzing specific cases in which both 
theories can be applied (for example, homogeneous or 
heterogeneous societies, industrialized and agricultural 
nations,and so on). By employing hypothetical particulars, 
the negotiators are able to make effective use of the 
available general information. These particulars provide 
the link between the theoretical development and the 
evaluation of principles of justice. Without hypothetical 
particulars, those in the original position would have little 
basis for preferring one conception of justice to another. 
The knowledge of hypothetical particulars behind the veil 
of ignorance undermines Schaeffer's claim that 11 • it 
is even doubtful that 'general' and 'particular' knowledge 
are at all separable in the manner Rawls assumes, so that 
any knowledge would remain once the particulars had been 
subtracted." 9' Quite the contrary is true. In theory, 
at least, any conception of justice and set of principles 
can be adequately discussed and tested in possible situa-
tions on the basis of general laws and theories together 
with the class of hypothetical particulars. 
Another major criticism of the veil of ignorance is 
that, the original position is unjust since the negotiators 
are denied knowledge of their particular plans of life. 
Consequently, the principles of justice are chosen in an 
initial situation that is unfair. 
One has to bear in mind that the negotiators have 
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to choose principles to determine the arrangement of the 
basic structure of a society. Although a negotiator will 
select principles to best advance his own interests, he 
realizes they will affect all members of his society. 
Consequently, the divergent interests of individuals have 
to be taken into account. There is nothing to prevent the 
many different possible plans of life from being discussed 
in the original position. By making use of accessible 
hypothetical particulars, the negotiators can evaluate any 
goal in life which might be held by one member of a society, 
or by many members of numerous societies. Therefore, it 
is incorrect to say that some plans of life are ruled out 
by the way the original position has been devised. All 
plans are available for discussion. The negotiator'. can 
iuminate over any end in life whilst, at the same time, 
remembering to advance his own index of primary goods as 
much as possiblk. 
Nagel asks, "Why should parties in the original 
position be prepared to commit themselves to principles 
that may \frustrate or contravene their deepest convictions, 
just because they are deprived of the knowledge of these 
convictions?" iO Bloom writes in a similar vein: 
Only the 'veil of ignorance' and the 'original 
position' makes consensus-possible: but once the 
scales fall from a man's eyes he may well find 
that his life plan does not accord with liberal 
democracy. Rawls asks that only those life plans 
that can co-exist be accepted, but he is not 
sufficiently aware of how far this demand goes 
and how many plans must be rejected on this 
ground • ~1 . 
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We have already seen how a wide and full discussion of 
all plans of life, as well as all possible social arrange-
ments of societies, is consistent with the requirements 
of the veil of ignorance. 
If, after lifting the veil, individuals discover 
their ends in life to be incompatible with the chos~n 
principles of justice, they cannot complain about the 
unjustness of the original position. They have to accept 
that their particular plans of life were considered by the 
negotiators to be unsuitable bases of principles of justice. 
To suggest, as Bloom does, that many plans will be rejected 
in this way, is only to admit that, in actual circumstances, 
individuals often fall short of the social ideals to which 
they aspire. After all, Rawls' theory of justice attempts 
to determine the most appropriate basic institutional 
framework of a society. There is no reason to reject a 
standard merely because some individuals or societies cannot 
adhere to its requirements. Any theory, whether in the 
natural or social sciences, will encounter particular 
anomalies for which it cannot account. These anomalies 
will orily become significant when they are so serious or 
numerous that the theory has to be revised, or even discarded 
altogether. Similarly, any theory of justice cannot accomm-
odate each and every plan of life. One cannot criticize 
Rawls' theory because it does not correlate with the 
aspirations of every individual. Instead, II • an 
important test of a theory of justice is how well it 
introduces order and system into our considered judge-
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ments over a wide range of questions." 12 
Motivational Assumptions. 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that Rawls 
makes five assumptions about the negotiators. All of these 
will now be examined in more detail. According to Ra~ls, the 
assumptions are plausible because they constitute reasonable 
and widely shared premises. 
validity of this view. 
Our task is to con~id~r the 
(a) The negotiators are aware of the fact that the 
circumstances of justice prevaiJ_ in their society. There 
are two sets of circums:tances; objective and:subjective. 
Objective circumstances fall into two categories of resources; 
human and natural. Human resources refer to man's limitations. 
Each individual cannot always do what 1 he wants, for he is 
either incapable of carrying out his plans alone, or else 
they can be frustrated by other persons. Examples of 
natural resources are land, water, minerals, and so on. 
No individual in any society has an abundant supply of all 
these. It would seem that some measure of co-operation 
between persons in the distribution of both human and 
natural resources is both desirable and necessary. 
'Moderate scarcity' obtains when such a distribution is 
necessary and possible; "Natural and other resources are 
not so abundant that schemes of co-operation become 
superfluous~ nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful 
ventures must inevitably break down." iJ 
The subjective circum~tances refer to differences 
between individuals. Not all persons have identical 
powers of attention, reasoning, memory and judgement. All 
do not share the same knowledge or ability. Individuals, 
therefore, have different interests and goals in life. 
Some plans of life will be incompatible with others, and 
any society is characterized by both an identity and a 
conflict of interests between its members: this seems to 
be an almost inevitable part of the human condition. 
The subjective and objective circumstances of justice 
are background conditions which are characteristic of all 
human societies. These circumstances reflect a need for 
principles of justice. A negotiator knows it makes sense 
to speak of choosing principles for the basic structure of 
his society, because the necessity for such principles 
exist. There is nothing controversial about this assumption, 
for, according to Rawls 11 • • a human society is character-
ized by the circumstances of justice. The account of 
these conditions involves no particular theory of human 
motivation. Rather, its aim is to include in the descrip-
tion of the original position the relations of individuals 
.to one another which set the stage for questions of justice." 
(b) Negotiators are not isolated individuals in 
the original position. They are continuing strands. This 
assumption deals with the link between a negotiator and his 
descendants. Those in the original position on any occasion 
realize they are contemporaries. The number of generations 
that can be represented in the original position at the 
same time is limited by the life expectancy of human 
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beings. This physiological fact can be expected to be 
part of a negotiator's general information. Since all 
negotiators are equally affected by principles of justice, 
there is nothing to prevent them from favouring the set of 
generations they represent. They could evoke the principle 
that no-one has a duty to posterity. The possibility of 
saving for future generations would not arise. Furthermore, 
this principle would be chosen irrespective of whether 
previous generations saved or not. Rawls attempts to solve 
this problem by introducing a motivational hss~mption to 
deal with the question of· justice between generations. 
Although the negotiators are mutually disinterested 
individuals, they are concerned to further the welfare of 
their nearest descendants. Their goodwill extends over at 
least two generations. Each person in the original position 
cares about the welfare of someone in the succeeding 
generation; every member of the succeeding generation is 
the subject of concern of someone in the present generation. 
This assumption is the only way of ·ensuring the maintenance 
of justice between generations. I shall discuss some 
difficulties with this view in Chapter Five. 
Apart from limited ties to succeeding generations, 
a negotiator strives to advance his index of primary goods. 
He takes no account of any possible allegiance to groups 
or sectional interests in his society. If groups are 
ignored in the original position, is Rawls assuming that 
homogeneity or heterogenfu'ity of societies is irrelevant 
for the choice of principles of justice? 
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Groups, in this context, are distinguished on the 
basis of either relatively permanent qualities (for example, 
race or language) or fundamental beliefs and attitudes 
(for example, religion and nationalism). These groups can 
have status and rights at a level which is somewhere 
between the individual and the state. Vernon Van Dyke 
explains this as follows: 
In practice many such groups demand what they regard 
as justice for themselves as collective entities; 
that is, they demand legal status and rights as 
collective entities. And when they get it, as they 
not uncommonly do, questions of justice for individ-
uals get intertwined with questions of justice for 
groups, for differentiations occur. among indi vi d-
uals depending on the group to which they belong. 
My contention is that to be satisfactory a theory 
of justice must concern itself with groups as well 
as individuals, and thus that groups as such must 
somehow be represented in the original situation. 15 
Rawls is well aware of the existen~e of plural societies. 
He makes very little reference to them because their 
composition is irrelevant for the selection of principles 
of justice. All in the original position are treated 
equally as moral persons, and the introduction of group 
membership would destroy the rationale for the veil of 
ignorance. Members of particular groups would try to 
protect the interests of their group at the expense of 
others. Consequently, no conception of justice would be 
acceptable to everyone in a society: Furthermore, dis-
crimination of this sort is likely to create envy and 
resentment, not diminish ~t, and so the negotiators could 
no longer assume the absence of envy. Behind Rawls' veil 
of ignorance, a negotiator is unaware of the nature of the 
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groups in his society. Nor does he know to which group 
he belongs. As a result, group affiliations play no part 
in the formulation of principles for the basic structure. 
However, any consideration of groups is not ruled out 
entirely in Rawls' theory. At both the constitutional 
convention and legislative assembly relevant facts about 
societies are revealed. Questions about group interests and 
allegiances are more appropriately dealt with at these 
stages. 
(c) The negotiators are assumed to be capable of 
a sense of justice. First of all, a negotiator is presumed 
to have the ability, opportunity and desire to compare 
conceptions of justice and formulate principles. Without 
these capabilities, it is pointless to spe.ak of a choice of 
principles at all. Of course, negotiators can still make 
wrong dec.isions. But Rawls seeks to minimize this possibil-
ity by removing all arbitrary factors through the device 
of the veil of ignorance~ Secondly, negotiators can depend 
on themselves and others to abide by the principles eventually 
chosen; that is, strict compliance is assumed. So those in 
the original position must be sure to select principles they 
can adhere to with no, or little difficulty. In other 
words, they consider, what Rawls calls, the 'strains of 
commitment'. 
Two difficulties can be raised about the strict 
compliance condition. Although the negotiators assume this 
condition, is it also not general knowledge among them that 
some persons in society do not ordinarily honour their 
I 
promises? Either they do not always mean what they say, 
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or they do not carry out these promises. If this is part 
of our general knowledge, should the negotiators take this 
into consideration when choosing principles of justice? 
It is easier to begin with the second question. In terms 
of an example, this question reads: 'as we know some 
people will not obey traffic regulations, should we not 
take account of this when formulating a road code?'. How 
do we then draw up a code at all? We would have to consider 
that some people obey traffic regulations, whilst others 
disobey. Furthermore, they can disobey in many different 
-~ 
ways. A similar situation would occur with the breaking 
of promises and the selection of principles. The strict 
compliance condition does away with this sort of problem. 
If the negotiators took some or all possibilities (and 
which one would we choose?) into consideration, the task 
of choosing principles would be totally impossible. 
The answer to the first question is implicit in 
the reply to the second. Some people do not generally 
honour their promises. But it is equally true that others 
do. Both facts would be available to the negotiators. If 
no-one kept his word, strict compliance could not be assumed 
in the original position. This is not characteristic of' 
human behaviour and can be ignored here. Is it reasonable 
to assume strict compliance if people both keep and break 
promises? Strict compliance is a formal condition. If it 
was not assumed, an element of injustice would be in.tr~-
duced to the formulation of principles, for it would favour 
those who habitually break their promises. Consequently, 
I 
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it is more reasonable to assume strict compliance in the 
original position, as it accords '\"ith the expectations of 
those who keep their promises. Once the veil of ignorance 
is lifted, some persons may decide not to adhere to the 
principles. , They will then be punished in terms of impure 
procedural justice. We must be careful to distinguish 
between the formal conditions of the original position, and 
the actions of negotiators after the veil of ignorance is 
removed. 
(d) A negotiator is assumed not to envy others who 
turn out to have a higher index of primary goods than him-
self. We must see if this is a valid assumption. Further-
more, we have to decide whether it is compatible with the 
general information that some men are envious and others 
are not. (The negotiators know both these general facts.) 
According to Rawls, envy is 11 • • the propensity to view 
with hostility the greater good of others even though their 
being more fortunate thari we are does not detract from our 
advantages. 11 16 We envy those whose index o.f primary goods 
is higher than ours, and we wish to diminish their advantages, 
even if this involves a loss for us. Moreover, others 
become aware of our envy and take care to protect their 
greater benefits. Envy, understood in this way, is dis-
advantageous flor everyone, since it breeds discontent and 
conflict in societies. If this sort of envy is to be 
avoided, it must form no part of the original position. 
This ensures that envy is denied a role in the choice of 
principles of justice. 
32 
As was mentioned earlier, the 'no envy' assumption 
is subject to certain limitations. A negotiator does not 
envy others who have a higher index of primary goods, 
provided the difference between himself and others does 
not exceed certain limits. Moreover, such inequalities 
must not be based on injustice. These limits are specified 
by the difference principle and the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity. I shall discuss them in Chapter 
Four. 
The assumption about envy is introduced in the 
account of the original position for tactical reasons and 
does not presuppose a certain moral psychology. Rawls says 
as much: "Therefore, for reasons both of simplicity and 
moral theory, I have assumed an absence of envy • II 17 
(My emphasis). The negotiators are oblivious of all their 
special psychological propensities, including envy. They 
are aware that some people are envious and others are not: 
in order to benefit the latter the absence of envy is 
assumed in the original position. 
(e) Finally, Rawls assumes that the negotiators, 
who are mutually disinterested, will try to advance their 
index of primary goods as much as possible. But what 
happens if a negotiator does not want many primary goods? 
Why should he try to attain more than he desires? There 
are two answers to this. First, a negotiator in the 
original position knows nothing about the details of his 
pl an of life. So he is unaware of how many primary goods 
he will actually wish to hayc once the veil of ignorance 
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is removed. Consequently, his best bet is to strive for 
the highest possible index of primary goods. This will 
enhance the negotiator's chances of fulfilling his plan 
of life in society. If the negotiator does not need his 
whole share of goods, he can dispose of them. Secondly, 
II • in circumstances of justice moderate scarcity 
obtains, so that by hypothesis not all that is claimed can 
. 18 
be granted." Some primary goods will be in abundance 
in society, and others in short supply, or not available 
at all. A n~gotiator neither knows which primary goods are 
at his disposal, nor how many of these he requires to 
advance his plan of life. It is therefore rational for a 
negotiator to take account of all possibilities by aiming 
for the highest index of primary goods. 
A common criticism of Rawls' negotiators is that they 
are self-interested, or even selfish, individuals with 
individualistic aims. Brian Barry is one who expresses this 
view: 
A man's 'conception of the good' may include in 
it the welfare of certain other people for whom 
he feels affection or special responsibility. 
But, for the purpose of the original position, 
it does not include· a substantive sense of justice. 
That is to say, a man cannot, in the original 
position, take as his end the idea that everyone's 
welfare should be increased as much as possible, 
or say that he would like a certain distribution 
of goods or utilities for its own sake.19 
We have already seen that there is nothing to prevent the 
negotiators from discussing any plan of life in the original 
position, including Barry's examples. A negotiator might 
hypothesize that a certain distribution of goods might be 
34 
desired for its own sake. However, this suggestion would 
be of no use to those trying to formulate regulatory 
principles which specify the arrangement of the major 
institutions of society as well as the rights and duties of 
its me.mbers. 
To tentatively suggest the principle that everyone 1 s 
welfare should be increased as much as possible is perfectly 
reasonable. Presumably, 'everyone', in this case, also 
refers to the negotiator formulating the ~rinciple. By 
increasing everyone's welfare, he increases his own, thereby 
advancing his index of primary goods. It appears, theh, 
there is no reason to suggest either that the negotiators are 
self-interested or that the choice of principles in the 
original position has to be individualistic in form. The 
negotiators can choose non-individualistic principles if 
they are best stiited to advance their indices of primary 
goods. We cannot say that, because individualistic prin-
ciples of justice are selected in ~he original position, 
the reasons for their choice lie ~n the interpretation of 
the original position. Many possible principles can be 
formulated behind the veil of ignorance and we need to 
examine the content of the two principles to understand 
why they are favoured by the negotiators. Rawls' original 
position is only individualistic in the trivial sense that 
the principles are chosen by individuals. The negotiators 
are not to be compared to 11 • self-centered economic 
competitors or seekers after power·. [A} far more help-
ful case is the relation between members of different 
religions; for while they are mutually disinterested under 
circumstances of justice, they are neither self-interested 
nor necessarily engaged in the pursuit of individualistic 
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Final Problems. 
I have argued that both the limits on knowledge and 
the assumptions made about the negotiators do not introduce 
unfairness or bias to Rawls' interpretation of the original 
position. (See Appendix for a comparison between this 
position and other societies.) We must now consider two 
final problems. 
First, ~s the original positi~n; ~device merely 
used to justify the choice of the two principles of justice? 
In A Theory.of Justice, we find the following: 11 • • the 
original position has been defined so that it is a situation 
in which the maximin rule applies." 21 And, 11 ·{w] e want to 
define the original position so that we get the desired 
' 22 solution." The maximin rule does indeed apply to the 
original position, but it need not be the only rule.to apply, 
for any conception of justice can be considered. Nego-
tiators might select principles by evoking some maximin 
or minimum rule to specify a person's .share of primary goods. 
So the first of the above quotations presents_ no problem. 
The second one, often used by critics, is extremely mis-
leading when taken out of context. The passage reads: 
"Now the reasons for the veil of ignorance go beyond mere 
simplicity. We want to define the original position so 
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that we get the desired solution. If a knowledge of partic-
ulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary 
contingencies." 23 The desired solution is that all those 
in the original position should be treated equally as moral 
persons: as we observed in the first section of this chapter, 
there is very little wrong with this view. Consequently, 
the original position has not been defined so that the 
choice of the principles of liberty and fa:irequality of 
opportunity together with the difference principle·is in-
evitable. 
The second problem is related to Rawls' use of such 
concepts as liberty, democracy, self~respect, and so on. 
Robert Paul Wolff has commented in another context: "It is 
shrewd of the philosophers of liberalism to insist that their 
world of private values is 
" 24 
the only probable world." 
Is there an emphasis on these concepts because the original 
position embodies the assumptions of classical democracy? 
The following account is based on Ronald Dworkin's article, 
"The Original Position". 25 
According to Dworkin, Rawls' social contract 
II must be seen as a kind of halfway point in a larger 
argument, as itself the product of a deeper political 
theory that argues for the two principles through rather than 
26 from the contract." Once we identify the features of 
such a 'deep' theory, the reasons for using the heuristic 
device of a contract become apparent. 
In Chapter One, I stated that contract theories 
are non-teleological; 'right' is prior to 'good'. One 
\ 
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would therefore expect principles of good to be subordinate 
to principles of right in Rawls' deep theory. Dworkin 
confirms this: "The original position is well designed to 
enforce the abstract right to equal concern and respect 
which must be understood to be the fundamental· concept of 
Rawls' deep theory." 27 For Rawls, the right to equal 
respect is restricted to human beings. (Peter Singer, in 
his recent and very interesting book, Animal Liberation, 
has argued that this right should also be extended to 
animals.) 28 Rawls' original position is worked out on 
the basis that all persons have an interest in determining 
the arrangement of the major social institutions of their 
society. This interest is only effective if all are given 
the equal right to concern and respect in the original 
position, 11 • a right they possess not by virtue of 
birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply 
as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give 
;justice." 29 Rawls' most basic concern, embodied in the 
original position, is with the right to concern and respect, 
and not with particular conceptions of liberty and democracy. 
Liberty and democracy play no part in the formulation of 
the original position. Dworkin comments:- "Rawls' most 
basic assumption is not that men have a right t.o certain 
liberties that Locke and Mill thought important, but that 
they have a right to equal respect and concern in the 
design of political institutions." JO 
A final thought: it might be possible to argue that 
even the right to equal concern and respect assumes the 
pre-eminence of morals and behaviour based on the traditions 
JB 
of European thought and experience. We have to take this 
into account. But we also have to be careful that relativism 
in social and politic al theory does not. lapse into nihilism. 
Any social theory has to have a starting point in which 
something is taken for granted. Perhaps a theorist should 
aim to assume as little as possible, and to justify what-
ever is assumed. As we have seen, Rawls has not failed to 
do this. Having analysed, and accepted, Rawls' interpretation 
of the original position, our next task is to discuss the 
two principles of justi6e chosen by the negotiators. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PRIORITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERTY 
There are three different.arguments as to why the 
negotiators prefer to protect their civil and political 
liberties before determining the distribution of social and 
economic primary goods. First,1 :,t;hej mo.st .. imp;ort..ant pr.imary 
good of self-respect is best secured by the priority of 
liberty. The second argument is based on the reasons 
advanced for liberty of conscience. Finally, a society's 
change in circumstances, from unfavourable to favourable, 
satisfies the conditions for the lexical ordering of the 
principles of justice. But before discussing these arg-
uments, we need to look at Rawls' conception of liberty. 
Liberty. 
As the negotiators have to select principles of 
justice to determine the ar~angement of the basic structure 
of society, liberty, in the first instance, refers to 
institutions and not to individuals.* Consequently, "[w] hether 
men are free is determined by the rights and duties established 
by the major institutions of society. Liberty is a certain 
1 pattern of social forms." The fundamental liberties, 
*We are, therefore, not concerned with special cases 
where an individual 'is free' but does not 'feel free', or 
vice versa. In any case, a negotiator has no knowledge of 
his own psychological propensities, althou~h he is aware of 
the interpl:ay between psychological factors and various 
forms of liberty. 
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protected by the first principle of justice 11 • • are, 
roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and 
to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of 
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought; freedom 6f the person along with the right to hold 
,. 
(personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
seizure as 2 defined by the concept of the rule of law. 11 
(My emphasis.) Liberty is represented by this system of 
basic liberties. Other 11 (1) iberties not on the list, for 
example, the right to own property and freedom of contract 
as understood in the doctrine of laissez-faire are not 
basic: they are not prote~ted by the priority of the first 
principle. 11 3 Libertarians, . in particular, have strongly 
objected to the exclusion of these so-called economic 
liberties. Perhaps the most persuasive account thus far 
has ~ome from Rawls' Harvard colleague, Robert Nozick. 4 
Third World countries, as well as the Eastern bloc, often 
regard food, shelter~ health-care and education as being of 
equal or more importance than the liberties included in the 
first principle. However, a negotiator, whose society is 
in favourable circumstances, assumes that such needs have 
already been, or can be, fulfilled. Further important 
forms of liberty, for instance, sexual freedom and the 
liberty to use drugs or alcohol, are also not ~~ong those 
embodied in the principle of liberty. 
Rawls' basic liberties refer to both, of what have 
sometimes been called, the 'negative' and 'positive' aspects 
of freedom, characterized as 'freedom from • (constraints)' 
and 'freedom to • (do, or omit, or be, or have)'. The 
debate about whether freedom should be defined in terms of 
either negative or positive elements has been deliberately 
ignored by Rawls, since 11 • for the most part this 
debate is not con~erned with definitions at all, but rather 
with the relative values of the several liberties when they 
come into conflict." 5 The significance of the various 
liberties is not merely a matter of definition, but a 
question of substantive political philosophy that can only be 
answered by a theory of justice as part of a theory of right. 
Rawls uses a triadic form of liberty: 11 • this 
or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this 
or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to 
6 do) so and so. 11 Reference is made to three items: the 
subject of the ascribed freedom;- the compulsion or constraint; 
the action or omission actually or hypothetically desired 
by the subject. The subject or agent may be a person, an 
association or a state. Constraints can take many forms. 
A person's actions have been constrained whether they have 
been influenced by public opinion, or by prohibitions 
defined by law. Rawls is mainly concerned with constituti'onal_·,· 
and legal restrictions because 11 • the rights and 
liberties referred to by these principles are those which 
are defined by the public rules of the basic structure." 7 
An individual's inability to take advantage of his lib-
erties as a result of poverty or a lack of education, or 
whatever' <,c-a:n also be regarded as a constraint. According 
to Rawls, such inabilities are not to be counted as 
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constraints definitive of liberty; instead, they affect a 
person's worth of liberty. (Norman Daniels objects to this 
line of reasoning, but I shall leave his argument until I 
discuss the worth of liberty in the last section of this 
chapter.) 
The triadic form of liberty connects the negative 
and positive aspects of freedom. Joel Feinb~rg comments 
that II if nothing prevents me from doing x, r am 
free to do X; conversely, if I am free to do X, then nothing 
prevents me from doing X. 'Freedom to' and 'freedom from' 
are in this way logically linked, and there can be no.special 
'positive' freedom to which is notralso a freedom from." 8 
Elsewhere, Feinberg states that, in cases where all three 
elements of the triadic form of liberty are present, 'freedom 
from' and 'freedo~ to' are two sides of the same coin, not 
two radically different types of freedom. 9 This.view 
represents Rawls' own position, as the following example 
illustrates: 
If, • ~' we consider liberty of conscience as 
defined by law, then individuals have this liberty 
when they are free to pursue their mdral, philos-
ophical, or religious interests without legal 
restrictions requiring them to engage or not to 
engage in any particular form of religious or 
other practice, and when other men have a legal 
duty not to interfere. 10 
Self-Respect and the Priority of Liberty. 
We can now turn our attention to the first of the 
three arguments for the priority of liberty. As self-
respect is the most important primary good, the nego-
tiators' foremost task is to secure it. Self-respect is 
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crucial, because 
~]ithout it nothing may seem worth doing, or if 
some things have value for us, we lack the will to 
strive for them. All desire and activity becomes 
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cyn-
icism. Therefore the parties in the original 
position would wish to avoid at almost any cost 
the social conditions that undermine self-respect. 11 
This account does exaggerate the effects of a loss of self-
respect in an attempt to show how essential it is. Although 
Rawls goes into detail about the meaning of self-respect, 
nowhere in A Theory of Justice does one find a substantial 
argument for its pre-eminence. Nevertheless, in my account, 
I shall assume that self-respect is the principal primary 
good. According to the first line of reasoning, the nego-
tiators can obtain their self-respect by first selecting 
the principle of liberty. Before we can discuss this 
approach, we have to examine what Rawls means by self-
respect or self-esteem. 
There are two sides to self-respect. First of all, 
self-respect is based on a person's sense of his own worth. 
This assessment depends on how an individual values his 
plan of life. One's self-respect is obtained by the feeling 
that one's plan of life is worth carrying out. Two distinct 
aspects are apparent in the first element of self-respect; 
having an actual plan of life, and its evaluation. In the 
second place, a person's self-respect is secure if he has 
confidence in his ability to fulfil his ~lan of life: a 
lack of confidence or a history of failure removes the 
basis of self-esteem. 
We now need to consider both aspects of an individ-
ual's sense of his own worth. First, , a person values a 
rational plan of life which satisfies the Aristotelian 
principle. This principle states that, " • other things 
equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized 
capacities (their innate or trained abilities) [for carrying 
out their plans of life], and this enjoyment increases the 
more the capacity is realized or the greater its complexity." 
Individuals find that as they become more expert at doing 
something their enjoyment of it increases. Furthermore, if 
a person can do two things equally we1i, he will prefer to 
do the one which requires gre~ter skill, ability, or effort. 
To use Rawls' example, chess is a more complicated game than 
checkers: a person who can play both equally well will 
generally choose to play chess, for activities failing ~o 
satisfy the Aristotelian principle (in this case, checkers) 
reduce an individual's sense of his own worth. The Aristotel-
ian principle is a principle of motivation, since, according 
to Rawls, it explains many of our desires, particularly why 
we favour certain activities and not others. 
The second aspect of a person's sense of his own 
worth, is the compani-on- effect of the Aristotelian principle: 
a p~rson only gai~s self-esteem when others approve of his 
plan of life. Individuals differ in ability and an approp-
riate plan of life for one need not be suited to all. But 
in any society there are a variety of communities and 
associations where the members of each have similar abilities 
and skills. The members of one community or association 
share plans of life with roughly the same interests and 
12 
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degree of complexity. ·A person's sense of his own worth 
depends on how others in his community ~espect his plan of 
life. Reassurance about one's own end removes self-doubt 
and diminishes the prospect of failure. 
It appears that a negotiator relies largely on other 
persons, rather than himself, to provide the basis of his 
self-respect. Allan Bloom comments: "The sense of one's 
own worth, he [that is, Rawls] reiterates time and time 
again, depends very much on the esteem of others. 
Rawls' s man is in every way depende.nt, 'other directed' 11 1 3 
Rawls' view is similar to Bloom's, differing only in 
emphasis, for he says that 11 • • our self-respect normally 
14 depends upon the respect of others. 11 (,My emphasis.) 
Possibly we do obtain self-respect in this way (and this is 
debatable), but it is a different question whether a nego-
tiator, who is pursuing his own best interests behind the 
veil of ignorance, should secure it on this basis. Never-
theless, ~s.I shal1 argue a little:·further ~n, even if 
one's self-respect is dependent on 6thers, Rawls is not yet 
out of the woods; 
According to the first argument, liberty provides 
the best social basis for self-respect. Rawls considers 
only two alternatives; whether ,self-respect should be secured 
by liberty or socio-economic status. Let us consider the 
cas~ for the latter; that is, how 6ne is valued by others is 
determined by one's socio-economic status. In this instance, 
status is worked out on the basis of income, wealth, and 
material means and resources in general. To have a higher 
socio-economic status than others means possessing more 
valuable material means and resources. Not everyone can 
have the highest status. Consequently, an·improvement of 
one's own position lowers someone else's. 
this is a zero-sum game for self-respect. 
In other words, 
The· situation 
is akin to the seedings in a squash racquets club. If I 
improve my ranking on the squash ladder, at least one other 
player's fortune declines as mine progresses. Very· little 
co-operation can be expected if individuals obtain respect 
in this way, for they would continually compete with each 
other to acquire greater self-esteem by accumulating as many 
material resources as possible. It ~ould be irrational for 
a negotiator to allow his self-respect to be determined by 
socio-economic status, since any information about his 
status is excluded from the original position. Upon 
removing the veil of ignorance, a negotiator might find 
he has relatively little socio-economic status and therefore 
almost no self-esteem at all. Furthermore, he has to safe-
guard his future. Acknowledging self-respect on socio-
economic grounds might turn out to be advantageous to ·~ 
particular negotiator. But disastrous losses of wealth,- and 
a corresponding decline in self-respect, can occur in the 
future. Admittedly the situation might be very different. 
A negotiator's fortunes might improve, but this is still 
too risky a basis for obtaining self-este~m. 
Everyon~'s self-respect could be equal if all had 
the same amount of material means and resources. But the 
negotiators reject this possibility, since limited inequal-
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ities of wealth are beneficial to the least advantaged 
representative man. If self-respect is secured by either 
liberty or socio-economic status, then the argument against 
socio-economic status (whether ~t is distributed equally or 
unequally), by elimination, establishes the claim of liberty. 
As Henry Shue comments: "The inference to the prio,r'i:ty of 
liberty is also an inference to the subordination of wealth 
and it s e quality • 11 15 
The discussion of socio-economic status and self-
respect reveals that a negotiator is not prepa~ed to accept 
an unequal share of the principal primary good. If every-
one is to have the same amount of self-respect, and if self-
respect is best secured by liberty, it follows that liberty 
haB to be shared equally by all. The first principle of 
justice chosen by the negotiators satisfies this require-
ment: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all. 11 16 The principle 
of liberty iB lexically prior to the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, because 
public affirmation of equal liberties for all provides the 
most secure social basis for self-respect. 
Rawls' argumen~ rests on the premise that an equality 
of some primary good will produce an equality of self-esteem. 
His main problem, as w~ have seen, is to decide which primary 
good should be made equal. But the premise itself heeds to 
be examined more closely. The emphasis on equalizing a 
primary good is directly related to Rawls' interprelation 
of self-esteem. We saw that, according to the companion 
effect of the Aristotelian principle, a person's sense of 
his own worth depends on the opinion of others who ~-iave 
similar plans of life. One has the s~ne self-respect as 
other persons when one is accepted as an equal by them. The 
basis of equality varies. For instance, the self-esteem of 
a tennis player is determined by whether or not the community 
of tennis players regards him as an equal. Contrary to 
Rawls' view, Nozick argues that self-respect is not based on 
criteria that equate persons, but on criteria that differen-
ti.ate them. A person evaluates his worth by comparing what 
he can do to others. For example, 
(a] man living in an isolated mountain village can 
sink 15 jump shots with a basketball out of 150 
tries. Everyone else in the village can only sink 
1 jump shot out of 150 tries. He thinks (as do the 
others) that he's very good at it. One day, along 
comes Jerry West. 17 
His self-respect in his own eyes, and in the estimation of 
others, has been reduced, because Jerry West, a professional 
basketball player, can probably sink at least 100 jump shots 
out of 150 attempts. One's self-esteem is relative to what 
one can do. From Rawls' perspective, a person who can sink 
15 jump shots will secure self-respect by being accepted 
by others who obtain the same score. According to Nozickt 
a person who sinks 15 jump shots will gain self-respect 
by comparing his effort to inferior ones. To quote Nozick 
again: 
Persons generally judge themselves by how they 
fall along the most important dimensions in which 
they differ from others. People do not gain self-
esteem from their human capacities by comparing 
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themselves to animals who lack them. C'I'm pretty 
good; I have an opposable thumb and can speak some 
language.') • When everyone, or almost everyone, 
has some thing or attribute, it does not function 
as a basis for self-esteem. Self-esteem is based 
on differentiating characteristics; that's why it's 
self-esteem. 18 
Self-respect is based on criteria that differentiate; 
if these criteria are equalized it will need to be based on 
something else. Once the negotiators have chosen the principle 
of liberty so that all have equal basic liberties, this 
principle can no longer function ~s the basis of self-respect. 
The negotiators will take their liberti~s for granted, and 
self-respect will be determined by the unequally distributed 
primary goods. As we saw earlier, Rawls considers only 
two possible bases of self-respect; liberty and socio-economic 
status. Having equalized their liberties, the negotiators' 
self-respect will now be dependent on their socio-economic 
status, (even though they are unaware of what their status 
is in the original position). This criterion can never be 
equalized, since the difference principle allows an unequal 
distribution of social and economic primary goods. Con-
sequently, after choosing the principles of justice, a 
person, .. who is no longer in the original position, will 
always calculate his own worth by comparing his socio-
economic status to the status of others. This is precisely 
the conclusion Rawls hoped to avoid. 
Whether or not one agrees with Rawls' first argument 
for the priority of the principle of liberty turns on a few 
key problems. Fi~st 9 Qan self-respect only be acquired 
on·· the basis of either liberty or socio-economic status? 
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Secondly, does a person's sense of his own worth depend on 
himself or others? Finally, if self-respect is 'other-
dependent', is it based on criteria that equalize, or 
criteria that differentiate? These are questions of moral 
psychology. If Rawls' answers to these questions are correct, 
the principle of liberty is prior to both the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle 
because it enables a negotiator to obtain an equal share of 
self-respect. But if Rawls' argument is derived from 
dubious premises - and I have indicated that there is 
evidence for this view ~ a conclusive argument for the 
priority of the principle of liberty will have to be estab-
lished in some other way. 
Liberty of Conscience. 
Rawls uses the example of liberty of conscience to 
show that the negotiators will try to protect their civil 
and political rights before deciding on the distribution of 
social and economic benefits. This is the second argument 
for the priority of the principle of liberty. In this 
particular case, the negotiators have to formulate a prin-
ciple to regulate their fundamental moral, philosophical 
and religious beliefs. Three different aspects have to be 
taken into account before agreement can be reached on the 
extent of the principle. 
First of all, the negotiators, behind the veil of 
ignorance, are unaware of their moral, religious and philos-
ophical beliefs. Nor do they know how seriously they regard 
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them. Furthermore, a negotiator cannot tell which views 
constitute the majority opinion of his society. In a 
position of ignorance and uncertainty, a negotiator will 
play his hand cautiously. He has to advance his index of 
primary goods as much as possible while avoiding unnecessary 
risks. This can best be achieved by following the maximin 
principle. The negotiator cannot afford to gamble with his 
beliefs, particularly if he turns out to take them seriously. 
If he permits tolerance of all vie~s, he is sure to have 
included his own. Tolerance cannot be extended to some 
beliefs at the expense of others, if a negotiator is to 
avoid possible persecution in the future. Consequently, all 
risks of suppression can be avoided, and tolerance of all 
beliefs guaranteed, if the principle of equal liberty of 
conscience for all is chosen. 
Norman Daniels has suggested 11 that some 
religious: views tend to impose and emphasize di visions and 
barriers ·among people with a generally harmful effect. If 
people in the original position know of these effects, why 
would they want to risk being exposed to them?" i9 Rawls 
would probably answer that the negotiators are well aware of 
these problems, but they cannot arbitrarily dismiss some 
beliefs ab initio in favour of others, especially as they 
are f6rmulating principles of justice for the basic structure 
of society. The beliefs of some cannot be restricted for 
the greater freedom of others. There is no question of 
evaluating various views by the principle of utility. It 
would be unfair to those who discover. that their beliefs 
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are proscribed. The negotiators stipulate the limits of 
tolerance. 
l 
If some persons exceed these limits, thereby 
contravening strict compliance theory, they must pay the 
appropriate penalty. 
Intolerant persons fall into one of two broad 
categories. In the first place, there is the optimistic 
view. If those, who are intolerant of others, find their 
beliefs tolerated by society, 1they might in the long run 
come to believe in tolerance themselves. This is based 
II • on the psychological principle that those whose 
liberties are protected by and who benefit from a just 
constitution will, other things equal, acquire an allegiance 
to it over a period of time. 11 20 It is difficult to say 
how many of the intolerant will be 'converted' in this way. 
A lot deperids on the form of intolerance. There is a large 
gap between being intolerant of a person's religious beliefs 
and being intolerant of a political system to the extent of 
conducting urban terrorism. Benjamin Barber questions Rawls' 
optimism about the highly intolerant: 
The sort of data deployed by those who are in-
terested in evidence indicate that the intolerant 
are largely beyond rationality and thus quite 
incapable of grasping what is at stake in the 
very idea of toleration. The intolerant defer 
to imagined superiors with the same irrationality 
that they bully imagined inferiors. Fanatical 
true believers often seem to regard toleration by 
others as a compliment to their own rightness 
rather than as a reprimand to their intolerance. 21 
Those who Barber has in mind prob~bly bel6ng to the 
second category of the .intolerant. The intolerant cannot 
complain if they are not tolerated by the remainder of 
society. But their freedom can only be restricted when the 
tolerant members of society have good reason to believe that 
their safety and the security of the institutions of liberty 
are threatened. Rawls emphasizes that the freedom of some 
is never restricted for a greater liberty for others. There 
is no appeal to ~tilitarian considerations. The liberty of 
the intolerant is only curbed to preserve a just institution. 
Each negotiator in th~ original position is presumed 
to advance and protect the interests of at least one other 
member of a succeeding generation. This is the second aspect 
to be taken into account when deciding on the extent of 
liberty of conscience. If the negotiators discriminated 
against certain moral or religious beliefs, certain persons 
in succeeding generations would be forced to accept less thari 
equal liberty. A following generation can only object to 
such a principle if, once they have reached the stage of 
political maturity*, they would choose a different conception 
of liberty of conscience for themselves and their descendants. 
Care must be taken to avoid a conflict of interests between 
generations. The negotiators' descendants will want their 
liberties to be protected as much as possible. This can 
only be achieved by consenting to equal liberty of conscience. 
Anything less than the extent of this liberty increases the 
risk of disputes between generations. 
The third aspect is that the negotiators' agre~ment 
on the principles of justice is, final. By recognizing the 
*In other words, they are no longer subject to the 
principle of paternalism. 
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finality of moral and religious obligations expressed in 
equal liberty of conscience, an individual cannot trade 
any portion of this liberty for greater social and economic 
benefits. Such bartering would not be unfair, since all 
would be equally disadvantaged. Nevertheless, a negotiator 
would not be tempted to reduce the extent of liberty of 
conscience. As favourable conditions are assumed, he knows 
his essential needs have been, or can be, fulfilled, and 
therefore his priorities lie in advancing his conception of 
liberty as best he can. Extra income and wealth are poor 
compensation for the sacrifice of certain moral or religious 
beliefs. Equal liberty of conscience is the only .possible 
answer. 
All three aspects of the argument for liberty of 
conscience are derived from the perspective of the original 
position. They are not based on 11 • • practical necess-
ities or reasons of state • [,. nor do they J • • rely 
on any special metaphysical or philosophical doctrines. 11 2 3 
Rawls' intentions are best summarized in his own words: 
My aim has been to indicate not. only that the 
principles of justice fit our considered judge-
ments but also that they provide the strongest 
argument for freedom • [L]iberty of conscience 
• should not be founded on philosophical or 
ethical skepticism, nor on indifference to religious 
arid moral interests. The principles of justice 
define an appropriate path between dogmatism and 
intolerance on the orie side, and a reductionism 
which regards religion and ~orality as mere 
preferences on the other. 24 
According to Rawls, the lines of reasoning used for 
liberty o~ conscience can be extended to all other basic 
liberties. The result of this process is the principle of 
liberty. Because these liberties safeguard important 
interests, the negotiators value them more highly than other 
primary social goods. Consequently, it is rational for the 
negotiators to best advance their index of primary goods 
by securing the greatest possible extent of these liberties, 
provided such liberties are shared equally among all members 
of a society. 
Some commentators have objected to the argument for 
liberty of conscience being extended to the whole range of 
basic liberties. James Fishkin, for example, regards Rawls' 
system of liberty as a heterogeneous list of liberties. 2 5 
He argues that different reasons have to be given for the 
various liberties, particularly as the rationale for civil 
liberties Cfor example, liberty of conscience) is distinct 
from the rationale for political liberties (for example, 
the right to vote). We .could imagine a situation where 
freedom of conscience could be guaranteed, although it would 
be impossible to establish political freedoms. The fundamen-
tal difference between Fishkin and Rawls is that Fishkin 
separates negative and positive freedoms, treating them as 
very different philosophiGal notions, while Rawls prefers 
to discuss the system of basic liberties as a whole. We 
saw in the first section of this chapter that Rawls adopts 
the triadic form of liberty. The extent of one freedom 
affects the whole system of liberty. For instance, a 
person's right to stand for public office is meaningless 
without freedom of speech and assembly. Since the liberties 
are connected in this way, a definition of the extent of any 
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basic liberty, is, in effect, a definition of the extent 
of the system of liberty. 
According to Fishkin, even though the negotiators 
might not exchange liberty of conscience for greater social 
and economic benefits, the same cannot be said for all of 
the other liberties on Rawls' list. This is incorrect. 
Since the basic liberties are not completely independent of 
each other, a reduction of the extent of one liberty for 
more wealth or whatever will affect the whole system of 
liberty. For example~ if a person dispenses with his right 
to be eligible for public office, the extent of his freedom 
of speech will diminish. Minor adjustments within the 
principle of liberty are only permitted, in certain circ-
umstances, to enhance the system of liberty. I shall discuss 
the restrictions on liberty after considering the third and 
final argument for the priority of the principle of liberty. 
The Lexical Ordering of the Two Main Principles of Justice. 
The third argument is based on a negative line of 
reasoning. It goes as follows: once the only good reason 
against the priority of the principle of liberty has been 
removed, its priority is both possible and necessary. 
Rawls does not specifically use this argument to establish 
the priority of liberty, but it is implicit in his theory. 
Of course, the third argument alone cannot determine the 
priority of the principle of liberty, for there is the 
assumption that other independent reasons for the principle's 
priority have been (or can be) provided. The arguments 
based on self-respect and liberty of conscience satisfy this 
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requirement. 
Whether a society is in favourable or unfavourable 
circumstances is critically important when deciding which 
theory of justice, general or special, is more appropriate. 
The degree of favourability is mainly judged by economic 
factors. A certain amount of food, clothing, shelter and 
eithe~ income or some source of monetary payment is essential 
for any member of society~ As the general economic conditions 
improve in society,. a stage is reached where the worst-off 
representative man's most urgent needs can be :fulfilled. 
Henry Shue calls this stage the 26 'date of economic adequacy'. 
In such a situation, individuals are no longer totally 
concerned with survival, II and a growing insistence upon 
the right to pursue our spiritual and cultural interests 
asserts itsel:f. 11 27 With the increasing :favourableness of 
circumstances 11 • • the marginal significance for our good 
of :further economic and social advantages diminishes relative 
to the interests of liberty • 11 28 Self-respect begins 
to emerge as the principal·primary good. 
At the date of economic adequacy, the basic liberties 
contained in the :first principle can be effectively exercised. 
All members o:f society can enjoy ~qual J.iberty. As Henry 
Shue comments: 11Equal liberties are not to be guaranteed 
formally-until there is no one for whom the guarantee will 
' 29 be merely formal." Therefore the priority of the prin-
ciple of liberty can now be established, since the only 
obstacle to its application, un£avourable circumstances, 
has been overcome. Henceforth, the negotiators cannot. 
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exchange any portion of their liberty for any other primary 
good, as they could do prior to the date -of economic .adequacy. 
I mentioned in Chapter One that the principles of 
justice are placed in a lexical or serial order. A prin-
ciple cannot be applied until those previous to it have 
been implemented. The principle of liberty is prior to 
both the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle in the lexical order. The connection 
between the date of economic adequacy and the lexical 
ordering of the principles of justice now becomes apparent. 
The requirements of the principle of liberty have to be 
fulfilled before any further principle can be established. 
Consequently, the first principle has to be defined, so 
that it has a fixed and limited applitation. An example 
will reveal why this should be so. If the right to parti-
cipate in political affairs implied that every individual 
should have a direct say in the formulation of public 
policy, very few, if any, large societies could carry this 
out. In such cases, the failure of the first principle 
would prevent any further principle coming into operation. 
From this we can see there are good grounds for drawing a 
distinction between favourable and unfavourable conditions 
for liberty in a society. The first principle of justice 
can only be effectively exercised once a society has reached 
the date of economic adequacy, thereby allowing the second 
principle to be introduced. As a result, the principles of 
justice can only be lexically ordered when favourable circ-
umstances are present in a society. 
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Restrictions on Liberty. 
The basic liberties can be restricted in certain 
ways. The delegates at the constitutional convention have 
to make sure that various liberties do not conflict. 
Marginal exchanges within the system of liberty are permitted 
provided they promote the first principle of justice. All 
changes to the system of liberty are subject to two rules, 
which hold unconditionally. First, whatever changes occur 
affect all members of society equally. For example, if 
freedom of speech is extended at the expense of :freedom of 
the press in a particular society, the rights of all members 
of that society are equally affected. According to the 
second rule, liberty can only be restricted for the sake of 
liberty itself. A freedom can only be limited to maintain 
or promote the same or any other freedom. This is because 
11 • arguments for restricting liberty proceed from the 
principle of liberty itself." JO The implication is that 
liberty can never be curtailed for economic and social 
benefits. 
Rawls uses two examples to illustrate his second 
.rule. In the first place, certain rules of order are 
necessary to enhance freedom of speech. Without these 
rules, the liberty to communicate one's thoughts and to 
benefit from intelligent discussion is impaired. The 
restrictions result in greater benefits. But this example 
clouds the issue it was meant ~o clarify. There are two 
reasons: First, restrictions on freedom of speech are 
not necessarily derived from the principle of liberty 
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itself. Secondly, these restrictions do not yield a greater 
extent of liberty. 
First of all, as Thomas Scanlon points out, if rules of 
order count as restrictions on freedom of speech, many other 
similar restrictions must be taken into account. Limits 
are placed on the time and place of various gatherings, for 
instance, political demonstrations, parades and festivals. 
Scanlon suggests that "[r]egulation of these activities is 
normally thought to be acceptable • • but it seems 
difficult to m~intain (without considerable stretching of 
the notion of a basic liberty) that in these cases basic 
liberties are being restricted only for the sake of the 
same or other basic liberties." 31 When considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of exercising freedom of 
speech, we do not only calculate its effect on the same 
freedom or other basic liberties. We take other factors 
into account. If a person wishes to hold a musi6 festival, 
those in the neighbourhood will have to decide whether they 
are willing to forego a few hours sleep. Although individ-
uals might have every right to stage a political demonstra-
tion, other citizens might fear that public buildings will 
be defaced in the process. In cases like these, Rawls' 
second rule is not the only deciding factor, since arg-
uments for (and against). limiting freedom of speech are 
not derived from liberty itself. 
The second point is that restrictions on freedom 
of speech do not result in a greater extent of liberty. 
The rules of debate do not secure more liberty for an 
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individual; they increase the benefits of that liberty. A 
greater worth of liberty is gained. There is some confusion 
here for Rawls himself seems to acknowledge this view: 
11 [w]ithout the acceptance of reasonable procedures of 
inquiry and debate, freedom of speech loses its value." 32 
(My emphasis.) When .a negotiator considers whether or not 
to restrict freedom of speech, he does not only refer to 
the system of liberty itself. He uses some criterion of 
the value of that freedom. This is contrary to Rawls' 
second rule. 
Rawls' second example deals with the political 
liberties of citizens and, in particular, the principle of 
participation. The extent of this prin6iple 11 • is 
defined as the degree to which the procedure of (bare) 
majority rule is restricted by the mechanisms of constitu-
tionalism. 11 33 Various restrictions are possible. A bill 
of rights fuay specify that certain liberties are not to be 
decided by majority rule at all. The separation of the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government 
may restrict the pace of legislative change. Whatever 
limitations are introduced have to affect all members of 
society equally. This complies with Rawls' first rule. 
According to the second rule, the devices of constitu-
tionalism have to promote the system of liberty. The extent 
of the principle of participation should be adjusted to 
reach 11 • the point where the danger to liberty from 
the marginal loss in control over those holding political 
power just balances the security of liberty gained by the 
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greater use of constitutional devi1ces. 11 Although this 
balancing process may extend the system of liberty, does 
the justification for any restrictions only appeal to 
liberty? Hart believes that, in cases like th.is,. 11 
resolution of conflict must involve consideration of the 
relative value of different modes of conduct
1 
merely the extent or amount of freedom. 11 35 
and not 
If Hart is 
correct, and I think he is, this example is much the same 
the 
as the first one, since a negotiator cannot adhere to Rawls' 
second rule. But there are instances where th.is rule does 
apply. Rawls notes that conscription for military service 
curtails the basic liberties of equal citizenship. 36 
This is justified provided the war, at home or elsewhere, 
is undertaken to preserve just institutions in any society. 
Reference is made to the extent of liberty. The restrictions 
imposed by conscription are allowed to prevent ever greater 
reductions of liberty. 
The example of the principle of participation 
raises yet another problem. Any conflict between liberties 
has to be settled from the perspect~ve of the represen-
tati ve equal citizen: 11 [t] o appeal to the interests of this 
representative man in apply~ng the principles of justice is 
to invoke the principle of common interest~" 3? But how 
does one adopt this perspective when considering limita-
tions on the principle of participation? The negotiators 
have the general facts of their society at their disposal 
at the constitutional convention. They have to consider 
the different values they place on conflicting liberties. 
With so many possibilities, it is difficult to see how 
those in the original position can apply the principle of 
common interest. What is the position of the represen-
tati ve equal citizen? No one 'best-worse alternative is 
obvious when " • different resolutions of the conflict 
[between basic liberties] will correspond to the interests 
of different people who will diverge over the relative 
value they set on conflicting liberties." 38 
We have seen from the discussion of Rawls' two 
examples that his second rule does not apply unconditionally 
to all limitations on basic liberties. His argument can be 
re-stated in this way. There are only two possibilities: 
liberty can only .be restricted for the sake of liberty, or 
liberty can be exchanged for greater social and economic 
benefits. The second case is to be avoided at all costs if 
the priority of the principle of liberty is to be maintained. 
But minor variations can occur within a system of liberty, 
and this is only to be expected at the constitutional 
c,onvention. As the second possibility is ruled out, we 
can accommodate these variations, and preserve the priority 
of the principle of liberty,\ by adop~ing the first poss-
ibility. This rule cannot be used in all cases, because 
it is often rational for the negotiators to justify 
restrictions on their liberty by referring to neither 
social and economic benefits nor the extent of liberty. 
Worth of Liberty. 
Liberty and worth of liberty are distinguished as 
follows: 11 • • liberty is represented by the complete 
system of the liberties of equal citizenship, while the 
worth to persons and groups is proportional to their 
capacity to advance their ends within the framework the 
system defines." 39 Norman Daniels questions the distinc-
tion between liberty and worth of liberty: 
The point here is whether it is useful to talk about 
something as a 'liberty' when we cannot effectively 
exercise it. Is it useful to be able to say 'my 
liberty is equal to Rock~feller's, but I cannot 
exercise 11 it 11 equally'? 0 .· 
The value of Rawls' distinction is that it separates two 
different notions: a principle of justice which applies, 
in the first instance, to the major social institutions of 
society, and an individual's use of that principle. Liberty 
is formally equal for all, although effectively it is not. 
In the first section of this chapter I mentioned that, in 
Rawls' theory, an inability to take. advantage of one's 
liberties is not counted as a constraint definitive of 
liberty •. It affects one's worth of liberty. Even if 
Daniels is correct in saying that the exclusion of economic 
factors from the category of constraints is arbitrary, the 
upshot is much the same. Whether these factors influence 
the formulation of the principle of liberty, or whether 
they form part of the worth of liberty, an individual's 
exercise of his 'effective liberty' depends, to some extent, 
on the material means and resources at his disposal. 
Those who have greater power and wealth have 
greater means to achieve their aims. (Here I follow Barry's 
definition of power "as the capacity to get other people· to 
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. lf1 
do what you want. 11 Weal th is defined 11 as the ability to 
42 obtain goods and services that you want." ) An hypothet-
ical example can illustrate this. Two individuals, A and B, 
are running for public office, and oppose one another in a 
single member constituency. The exact office and the details 
.of the election procedure are irrelevant~ According to the 
first principle of justice, A and B are entitled to the same 
basic liberties. Let us further assume that A has ample 
financial means to promote his candidature, whilst B's 
resources· are· m·inimal ~ , A is able to draft and distribute 
policy statements in the form of pamphlets and posters, to 
employ an army of workers to canvass voters and to hire 
pollsters and advisers to plan the logistics of his campaign. 
By contrast, B can afford none of all this. He has to 
virtually conduct a one-mari campaign, paying personal visits 
on voters and relying on the support of volunteers. B 
might value his eligibility for public office as much as A, 
but he is unable to exercise his liberty as effectively. 
, Rawls was well aware of the type of problem I have 
just outlined. In his view, the constitution must be 
drafted so that all members of society have a fair opp-
ortunity to participate in the political process. Ideally, 
II those similarly endowed and motivated should have 
roughly the same chance of attaining positions of political 
authority irrespective of their economic and social class." 43 
Any citizen should be able to offer proposals of his own 
for debate and to have the opportunity to assess and decide 
on questi6ns of social, economic and political policy. 
A number of devices could be used in an attempt to 
preserve a fair value of liberty for all. First, there 
must be some effort to establish a fair distribution of 
resources in a society whose economy is based on free 
enterprise and private ownership of property. Secondly, 
government sponsorship should be used to promote free 
discussion of matters of public importance. Finally, 
political parties should not be reliant on donations from 
private sources. Political campaigns ought to be financed 
by the state •. It is interesting to note that this latter 
provision, long accepted in Sweden and West Germany, made 
a hesitant appearance in the 1976 United States Presidential 
election, and was the subject of a recent British Commission 
of Inquiry headed by Lord Houghton, former chairman of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. 44 
Universal suffrage alone cannot maintain the fair 
value of political liberty. According to Miliband, in a 
capitalist society, 11 ( tJ he act of voting is part of a much 
larg~r political process characterized • • by marked 
inequality of influence. Concentration on the act of voting 
itself, in which formal equality does prevail, helps to 
obscure that inequality 11 45 Social and economic 
inequalities have to be regulated to maintain the effective-
ness of the principle of participation. 
The distinction between the formal provisions of 
liberty and the capacity to take advantage of them is a 
critical test for Rawls' conception of justice. In this 
chapter we have seen how the negotiators emphasize the 
68 
priority of liberty at the expense of further economic and 
social benefits. But there is little point in opting for 
the priority of the principle of liberty if many individ-
uals will never be able to make full use of these rights. 
According to Rawls, no negotiator will end up in this 
situation. Speaking of the right to equal political 
participation, he comments: 
In a well-governed state only a small fraction of 
persons may devote much of their time to politics 
• But this fraction, whatever its size, will 
most likely be drawn more or less equally from all 
sectors of society. 46 -
If any of Rawls' representative men can hold positions of 
political power, all members of society are able to make 
effective use of their basic liberties. 
We have se.en that the capacity to exercise liberty. 
-- ·-
depends, to some extent, on a person's income, wealth and 
material resources. In spite of the close connection 
bietween the priority of liberty and self-respe~t, 11 [t] o 
some extent men's sense of their own worth may hinge upon 
their institutional position and their income share." 
Income, wealth and material resources will have to be 
regulated if all are to have a f~ir value of liberty. 
Social and economic inequalities are regulated by the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle. In the next chapter, we have to examine whether 
these principles do in fact enhance the effectiveness of 
liberty for all members of society. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity. 
The principle of fair equality of opportunity is 
second in the lexical order of the principles of justice. 
It is, therefore, the important link between the first and 
third ranked principles, namely, the principle of liberty 
and the difference principle. Rawls states 11 •• , • that the 
role of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is to 
insure that the system of cooperation is one of pure 
procedural justice. Unless it is satisfied, distributive 
justice could not be left to take care of itself, even 
1 within a restricted range." After choosing the first 
principle, a negotiator has to protect two important 
interests. First, he has to be sure of exercising his 
basic liberties effectively. Secondly, a negotiator, who 
wishes to enhance his worth, has to safeguard whatever 
chances he might have to increase his share of economic 
and social benefits. In Rawls' opinion, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity satisfies both requirements. 
When speaking of formal equality of opportunity, 
we mean, to use Rawls' phrase, II • careers are open to 
talents"; that is, 11 • positions are open to those 
able and willing to strive for them." 2 Positions, in 
this context, are 11 • pos~tions of authority and offices 
of command • " in society. J In principle, everyone 
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has equal access to these positions, but, in effect, this 
is not so, since individuals differ in natural talents and 
abilities. Furthermore, the development of such assets is 
often influenced by social circumstances (for example, 
weal th). Those who advocate formal equality of opportunity 
pay no attention to the principle of redress; that is 
II • the principle that undeserved inequalities call for 
redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endow-
ment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow 
compensated for. 11 4 
By contrast, the negotiators accept both the 
provisions of formal equality of opportunity and the prin-
ciple of redress. Careers are open to talents, but all 
should have a fair chance to gain access to positions of 
authority. The principle of fair equality of opportunity 
expresses this view: 
assuming that there is a distribution of 
natural assets, those who are at the same level 
of talent and ability, and have the same willing-
ness to use them, should have the same prospects 
of success regardless of their initial place in 
the social system, that.is, irrespectiv~ of the 
income class into which they are born. 5 
The negotiators realize this may not be the most efficient 
principle. Everyone's situation might be improved if 
certain groups were assigned to, and others excluded from, 
specific positions •. In some respects, Plato's di vision of 
classes and functions is an example of this arrangement. 
The negotiators, behind the veil of ignorance, would 
consider the worst possible outcome. It is not worth 
exchanging opportunities for benefits provided by the 
priviliged since the disadvantaged, who debarred them-
selves from holding any position of authority, would be 
II • excluded from certain external rewards of office 
such as wealth and privilige • [, as well as prevented] 
from experiencing the realization of self which comes from 
a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties." 6 In 
addition, the negotiators are constrained by their choice 
of the principle of liberty. All individuals cannot exercise 
their liberties effectiv~ly or increase their worth if some 
are automatically excluded from holding particular positions. 
They can best protect their basic liberties and advance 
their index of primary goods by accepting the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity for all~ 
Nevertheless, the n~gotiators do envisage the 
possibility of restricting this principle on occasions. 
Part (a) of the Second Priority Rule reads: 11 an inequality 
of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with 
7 the lesser opportunity." An inequality must favour the 
less advantaged, and not everyone, as was the case above. 
The attempt to eradicate inequalities of opportunity 
might interfer~ with the social system and the operations 
of the economy to such an extent, that the opportunities 
of the disadvantaged might eventually turn out to be even 
more severely limited. Opportunities ar~ only restricted 
for the sake of greater long~term opportunities, and not 
for further social and economic benefits. · 
The principle of fair equality of opportunity is 
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prior to the difference principle. When formulating an 
opportunity principle, a negotiator knows that he might 
have a low index of primary goods. He realizes there 
could be good reasons for an unequal distribution of 
social and economic benefits. But these disparities can 
be reduced if fair equality of opportunity has absolute 
weight over the regulation of material means and resources. 
From the negotiator's point of view, it is rational for 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity to be the 
second of the lexically ordered principles of justice. 
A society's government has an important role to 
play in establishing the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. Those who have similar abilities and motivation 
have to be given equal chances of education. Either 
subsidized private schools or a system of public schooling, 
or even both, will have to be introduced. 
be assured of free choice of employment. 
Everyone has to 
Rawls believes 
that this can only be achieved if the policies and prac-
tices of firms and associations are kept under close 
surveillance to maintain careers open to talents and to 
prevent the formation of monopblies. In o£der to ensure 
fair equality of opportunity fo~ all, the government 
guarantees a social minimum in some form of payment or 
another (for example, negative income tax). The details 
of these background institutions are worke~ out at the 
stage of the legislative assembly, where the negotiators 
are constrained by the principles of justice and a just 
constitution. Nevertheless, a negotiator still has to 
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consider the implications of applying this principle when 
first formulating it behind the full veil of ignorance. 
At a first glance, it appears that a large bureaucracy with 
considerable powers will be required to enforce fair 
equality of opportunity for all. Considerable efficiency 
might have to be sacrificed for justice, and if this is so, 
Rawls' priority rule for restricting opportunities will 
probably come into operation. 
James Coleman raises two potentially serious 
8 problems for the principle of fair equality of opportunity. 
We have seen that the viability of this principle depends, 
to quite a large extent, on e_quali ty of opportunity in 
education. Coleman draws on the experience of an extensive 
research programme to question the adequacy of Rawls' 
. . f . d t. 9 provisions or e uca ion. There is an incompatibility 
between the equal resources of the schools and the inequality 
of resources held by families. Consequently, 
• inequality bf opportunity is the starting 
point, brought about through the unequal family 
resources available to different children. Effective 
reduction in inequality of opportunity can only 
come about by increasing the ratib of public to 
private resource inputs to education, since the 
public inputs are egualizing and the private ones 
are unequalizing. 10 
We are now faced with a dilemma. If continual 
emphasis is placed on increasing public resources, inequality 
of educational opportunity can be reduced, but it can never 
be eradicated as long as children come from differing family 
environments. According to Coleman, a child's achievements 
at: school are strongly influenced by the care and attention 
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he experiences at home. His reading and spelling skills, 
in fact his performance at school in general, is related 
to the patience, guidance and en~ouragement given by his 
parents. Equality of educational opporttinity will only 
be achieved when the source of inequality is completely 
removed. In other words, the family unit will have to be 
abandoned: !' • • the equalizing institutions must invade 
the home, pluck the child from his unequalizing environment, 
d b . th" t 1·. . t11 11 an su Jec im o a common equa.1z1ng environmen. 
Before discussing Rawls' response to this dilemma, 
it is worth noting that Coleman's views on education have 
been questioned • Steven Klees and Kenneth Strike state: 
" • the empirical evidence on which Coleman rests his 
claim that the family environment contributes more substan~ 
tially to success in school than does the school environment 
is still quite controversial." 12 (My emphasis.) Present 
knowledge indicates that schools are becoming increasingly 
effective in achieving equality of educational opportunity, 
and can become even more so, without requiring the abolition 
of the family unit. Furthermore, Coleman has not taken 
account of more recent research undertaken by Jencks and 
others. 13 They 11 • • conclude that neither the family 
environment nor school environment substantially affect 
an individual's income or job status." 14 (My emphasis.) 
As a result, if we believe Jencks' group 11 • • Coleman's 
discussion of equality of opportunities is irrelevant to 
the demand of the principle of justice for fair equality 
of opportunity, since an institution (family or school) 
which affects neither the distribution of wealth nor 
position cannot violate Rawls' second principle." 15 
Even if we ignore Jencks' results, family environments 
would be more equal in a Rawlsian society than in any 
present one; thus, Coleman's objections can be ignored. 
Coleman's reply to Klees and Strike is extremely 
evasive: 11 [Klees and Strike] must choose between 
their argument that schools are so effective that they 
can overcome educational inequalities arising from the 
family • and their argument, following Jencks~ that 
schools are ineffective.~ 16 I have quoted at length from 
these sources for two very different reasons. First of all, 
the negotiators are entitled to know general information; 
consequently, they will be aware of the major differences 
of opinion over equality of education. They have to take 
this into account when considering the viability of the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity as opposed to, 
.say, formal equality of opportunity. Secondly, Coleman's 
critics have not conclusively refuted his fundamental 
point; if there are any differences in environment between 
families, ~ inequality of educational opportunity must 
result. ·The emphasis I have added to some of the recent 
quotes reveals that perhaps the family environment is no 
more important than the school environment, and possibly; 
neither of these environments may affect a person's income 
' 
or job status; but, we cannot conclude, on this basis, that 
the family environment is completely irrelevant for 
educational opportunity. Coleman's dilemma still stands; 
or, at least, a negotiator cannot afford to ignore it. 
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We saw that, according to Coleman~ Rawls either has 
to permit inequality of educational opportunity, or, if this 
is unacceptable, to equalize it by breaking up the family 
unit. In Coleman's opinion, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the negotiators will select the abolition 
of the family: 
Given Rawls's conception, that the social contract 
places in the hands of a disembodied central agent 
all primary goods, it is diCficult to see how that 
agent could do less, iri following Rawls's principle 
of equality of opportunity, than to remove the 
child from the family and place him in an environment 
that will be effectively equal, and not only formally 
so. 17 
Is the separation of children and parents compatible with 
the first principle of justice? This is the main question 
a negotiator has to answer. Coleman suggests that the 
principle of liberty would not be violated, since the 
reduced liberty of the parents would be offset by the 
child's increased liberty once he is no longer subject to 
the constrictions of the parental home. Of course, the greater 
educational opportunities a child receives may not counter-
balance other possible disadvantages (for example, more 
impersonal care and attention). But the negotiators cannot 
permit exchange of liberty between parent and child. The 
principle of paternalism states: "[w]e must choose for 
others as we have reason to believe they would choose for 
themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding 
rationally. 11 18 A parent cannot consider a trade-off of 
liberty between himself and his child; the liberties and 
opportunities of the child are more important. 
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Rawls admits that the family unit limits the 
effectiveness of fair equality of opportunity for all: 
Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by 
itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of 
equal opportunity inclines in this direction. 
But within the context of the theory of justice 
as a whole, there is much less urgency to take 
this course. The acknowledgement of the diff-
erence principle redefines the grounds for social 
inequalities as conceived in the system of liberal 
equality • 19 
But a negotiator cannot regard the theory of justice as a 
whole before the completion of the third stage; that is, 
the legislative assembly. When formulating a principle of 
opportunity he cannot rely on the choice of background 
institutions to be chosen in the future. As we s a\:Y in 
Chapter One, finality is one of the constraints of the 
concept of right. The principles of justice are considered 
as the final court of appeal. It is the principles them~ 
selves that determine what is just ·or unjust. The back-
ground institutions can only play a supportive· role. 
Consequently, a negotiator who is formulating a principle 
of 6pportunity, has to assess, at this stage~ the effective-
ness of fai~ equality of opportunity. If, as Rawls 
suggests, he is not prepared to abolish the family, opp-
ortunities can never be effectively equal for all. 
According to James Fishkin, the resolution of this 
dilemma is unsatisfactory. 20 In terms of Rawls' defini-
ti on 
• the second principle only requires equal 
life prospects in all sectors of society for those 
similarly endowed and motivated. If there are 
variations among families in the same sector in 
how they shape the child's aspirations, then while 
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fair equality of opportunity may obtain between 
sectors, equal chances between individuals will 
not. 21 
Differences among familie~ in the same sectcir would be 
tolerated as long as opportunities between sectors are 
equalized. By selecting fair equality of opportunity, a 
negotiator will be taking the risk of turning out to be a 
member of a disadvantaged family within a sector. If a 
negotiator takes this chance, he has not followed the 
maximin principle. This risk can only be avoided by 
breaking up the family unit to ensure equal life prospects 
for everyone~ Since the negotiators have rejected this 
possibility, their best bet is to choose the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity whilst realizing that it can 
only be imperfectly carried out. Some risk is involved, 
but it is minimal compared to the far less substantial 
guarantees provided by formal equality of opportunity. A 
negotiator has, in fact, followed the maximin ·principle 
because he has calculated and selected the 'best-worst' 
alternative. 
We can now discuss the second problem raised by 
Coleman. Results of empirical research have shown that the 
social background of classmates has some effect on educa-
tional achievement and, therefore, in the long run, 
influences the distribution of opportunities. As freedom 
of the person is one of the basic liberties secured by the 
first principle of justice, parents will have equal freedom 
in the choice of schools for their children. This could 
result in socially homogeneous schools, with a difference 
in educational opportunities between them. (The busing of 
schoolchildren in some parts of the United States is a 
recent attempt to solve this problem.) Coleman argues 
that no regulation of the composition of the schools 
would be allowed, since liberty would be restricted for 
greater equality of opportunity, rather than for liberty 
itself. Voluntary segregation would have to be tolerated. 
Furthermore, this could split 11 • • society into hostile 
. 22 
self-segregated subgroups." 
Thomas Condon suggests that the negotiators, who 
are aware of the results of the research conducted by 
Coleman and others 
• would all choose to create socially heterogen-
eous neighbourhoods and schools because first, that 
would be 'to everyone's advantag~,' and second, ·we 
take 'unity of the self' and self-respect' '(for others 
as well as ourselves) as fundamental goods, goods that 
we would all want, whatever.else we wanted. 23 
This view is basically correct, although it is misleading. 
The arrangement of a system of schooling is more approp-
iately discussed at either the constitutional convention 
or the legislative assembly (or both) when the negotiator 
is aware of the relevant facts about his society. What-
ever system is chosen will have to comply with the require-
ments of the principles of justice. Even though the extent 
of liberty cannot be reduced for greater equality of 
opportunity, we do not have to maintain, as Coleman does, 
that voluntary segregation has to be tolerated. According 
to the priority rule for opportunity, equality of opportun-
ity can only be limited to prevent the disadvantaged from 
suffering even greater inequalities. Disparities in 
educational opportunities cannot be permitted if they 
cannot be justified in terms of this priority rule. 
In Coleman's estimation "Rawls' s principle [ of 
fair equality of opportunity] implies either merely a 
formal rather than a substantive elimination of inequal-
ities or no limitation upon the collective use of resources 
to arrive at the objective." 24 If anything, Rawls' prin-
ciple is neither of these alternatives. It is certainly 
not interpreted as merely careers open to talents, the 
meaning of formal equality of opportunity. Since the 
institution of the family is not abolished, fair equality 
of opportunity cannot be effectively equal for everyone. 
The negotiators will not interpret the principle in this 
way if they know it cannot be implemented. As the prin-
ciples of jusiice are lexically ordered, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity has to be fully established 
before the difference principle can come into operation. 
It is irrational to choose the 'strong' interpretation of 
Rawls' principle when no further principle criuld be 
introduced to regulate social and economic benefits. 
Rawls' fair equality of opportunity is a combination of the 
acceptable fe~tures (that is, acceptable to the nego-
tiators) of Coleman's alternatives. The negotiator's 
main task is to maximize the effectiveness of equal 
opportunities for all. Rawls comments: 
• fair equality of opportunity means a certain 
set of institutions that assures similar chances 
of education and culture for p~rsons similarly 
motivated and keeps positions and offices open to 
all on the basis of qualities and efforts 
reasonably related to the relevant tasks and 
duties. It is these institutions that are put 
in jeopardy when ine~ualities of wealth exceed a 
certain limit . • 5 
The role of the difference principle is to regulate social 
and economic inequalities so that all individuals have an 
equal chance to exercise both their opportunities and basic 
liberties. 
The Difference Principle. 
Both the principle of liberty and the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity are determined from the 
perspective of the representative equal citizen. By.con-
trast, the distribution of social and economic benefits 
is judged in terms of the least advantaged group. There 
is one representative man for each stratum of society; the 
strata are differentiated on the basis of income and wealth, 
correlated with power and authority. For instance, it is 
assumed that those with g~eater wealth will generally be 
in positions of authority and have substantial power. 
Expectations are defined II • • as the index of primary 
social goods which a representative individual can look 
forward to. 11 26 A representative man's life prospects 
depend on his index of primary social goods. 
The immediate problem is to define the least 
advantaged group. Rawls suggests two approaches. First, 
we can choose a particular social posi_tion (for example, 
an unskilled worker). All those who have the same or less 
than the average income of this group are the least 
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advantaged. Their index of primary social goods is the 
average of the group as a whole. The second approach is 
to define the least advantaged as those who have less 
than half of the median income and wealth. One, or some 
combination of, these approaches is presumed to be 
satisfactory. J. E. J. Altham suggests an alternative 
way of determining the least advantaged, but, for the 
purposes of my analysis, it is not necessary to question 
Rawls on this point. 27 Having defined the least fortunate 
group, dt is only necessary to make ordinal judgements 
about their expectations. We can decide when the least 
advantaged will be better off by calculating their expecta-
tions in each of a number of possible arrangements of 
social and economic benefits. 
The efficiency of economic and social arrangements 
can be judged by applying Pareto optimality to the expecta-
tions of representative men. The principle of efficiency 
reads as follows: 
• an arrangement of rights and duties in the 
basic structure is efficient if and only if it 
is impossible to change ~he rules, to redefine the 
scheme of rights and duties, so as to raise the 
expectations of any representative man (at least 
one) without at the same time lowering the 
expectations of some (at least one) other represen-
· tative man. 28 
But efficiency does not take priority over justice. The 
principle of efficiency is constrained by both the prin-
ciple of liberty and the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
The negotiators. have to dee ide how to regu'l ate 
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economic and social inequalities so as to maximize the 
expectations of the least advantaged group. I mentioned 
in Chapter One that the 'benchmark' is an equal distribu-
tion of all primary social goods. Basic liberties and 
opportunities are already equal for all persons. Why not 
equalize economic and social benefits as well? But Rawls 
argues that the disadvantaged can receive more in an 
unequal system than in an equal one. By applying ther 
maximin principle, the expectations of the least advantaged 
can be maximized-when the negotiators choose the difference 
principle:· 11 (s] ocial and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are • • to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged • 11 2 9 The greater expectations 
of the better situated provide them with the incentive to 
undertake projects which raise the long-term prospects of 
the least advantaged. Every individual will benefit in 
one way or another if the economic system becomes more 
efficient, or if technological innovations proceed at a 
more rapid pace. This is a perfectly just scheme that is 
also compatible with the principle of efficiency. No 
change in the expectations of the more advantaged can 
increase the index of primary social goods of the least 
advantaged. It is also possible for a scheme to be just 
and yet not be the best arrangement. This is when the 
difference principle has not been fully carried out; the 
greater expectations of the more advantaged raise, but 
have not yet maximized, the expectations of the least 
advantaged. 
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Rawls assumes that the expectations of the represen-
tative men are 'chain-connected'; that is, " if an 
advantage has the effect of raising the expectations of the 
lowest position, it raises the expectations of all persons 
in between." JO Expectations are also 'close-knit'; that 
is II • it is impossible to raise or lower the expecta-
tions of any representative man without raising or lowering 
the expectation /.of. every other representative man, 
especially that of the least advantaged." Ji Consequently, 
everyone gains when the conditions of the difference 
principle are satisfied. However, Rawls does not maintain 
that chain-ccinnectedness and close-knittedness always work, 
either in theory or in practice. But, even if these 
notions are incorrect, the argument for the difference 
p~inciple is not affected. 
There are four vi~tues in choosing the difference 
principle. First,, it carrie~ out some of.the _require-
ments of the principle of redress. Justice is prior to 
efficiency. Everyone's natural talents are regarded as 
part of the common assets of society used to promote the 
well-being of all persons. Secondly, as the difference 
principle advances the index of primary social goods of 
all persons it can be justified to everyone. It is a 
principle of mutual benefit. Thirdly, the difference 
principle provides an interpretation of fraternity; that 
is II • the idea of not wanting to have greater advan-
tages unless this is to the benefit of others who are 
less well off. 11 32 Finally, in terms of the difference 
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principle, persons are not only treated as means, but also 
as ends in themselves. According to Rawls' interpretation, 
11 [t]o regard persons as ends in themselves in the basic 
design of society is to agree to forgo those gains which 
do not contribute to their representative expectations. 11 33 
Apart from being constrained by the principle of 
liberty and the princ:.iple of fair equality of opportunity, 
the conditions of the difference principle also have to 
be consistent with the just savings principle. The just 
savings principle is selected once the principles of justice 
for institutions have been chosen. This principle is 
designed to protect any one generation from totally 
depleting the resources of their society, thereby placing 
succeeding generations at a considerable disadvantage. The 
negotiators have to decide on a savings rate with the 
understanding that all generations will also save at the 
same rate. Real capital is accumulated and passed on from 
generation to generation. By capital, Rawls means 
f 
11 ·• • not only factories and machines, and so on, but 
also the knowledge and culture, as well as the techniques 
and skills, ithat make possible just institutions and the 
fair value of liberty • 11 This concludes the description 
of the main features of the difference principle. In 
order to assess the viability of this principle, I shall 
discuss it from two points of view; the perspectives of 
the least advantaged and the more advantaged. 
The Perspective of the Least Advantaged. 
To begin with, the difference principle is com-
patible with considerable inequality. The more advantaged 
can maximize their share of social and economic benefits 
even if the expectations of the least advantaged are barely 
increa~ed. For instance, the more advantaged oan justify 
an eighty percent increase in their index of primary social 
goods by raising the index of the least advantaged by one 
percent. Rawls contends that such inequalities are unlikely 
to occur: 11 (w] hile nothing guarantees that any inequalities 
will not be significant, there is a persistent tendency for 
them to be levele.d down by the increasing availability of 
educated talent and ever widening opportunities." 35 Equal 
liberties and fair opportunities for all persons will 
reduce the inequalities of the difference principle. But 
my analysis of the principles of liberty and fair equality 
of opportunity revealed that an individual's ability to 
make use of his basic liberties and opportunities depe?ds, 
to some extent, on his share of economic and social 
benefi.ts. In other words, the successful application of 
the principles of liberty and fair equality of opportunity 
depend on the formulation of the difference principle. A 
negotiator is now faced with the following problem: 
(1) equal liberties and opportunities limit social and 
economic inequalities, but 
(2) equal liberties and opportunities are only effec-
tively equal when social and economic inequalities are 
limited. 
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This problem can be solved by regulating social and 
economic inequalities without relying on the equalizing 
effects of the liberties and opportunities (that is, to 
satisfy (2) before (1)). A negotiator has to decide 
whether the inequalities compatible with the difference 
principle support, or undermine, the principles of liberty 
and fair equality of opportunity. This decision is partic-
ularly important to the least advantaged, since their 
share of economic and social benefits is less than the 
rest of society and, consequently, their basic liberties 
and opportunities will be less effective as well. 
There is a second reason why Rawls believes that 
the inequalities of the difference principle will not be 
significant: II • the difference principle not only 
assumes the operation of the other principles, but it 
presupposes as well a certain theory of social institu-
tions. 11 36 If a competitive economy, with or.without 
private ownership of the means of production, and an open 
class system is established inequalities will be kept to 
a minimum. The details of the background institutions 
are worked out at the constitutional convention and the 
legislative assembly. There are two replies to this 
argument. First, the choic~ of~institutions is don-
strained by the principles of justice. If disparities 
are consistent with the difference principle, background 
institutions cannot reduce them. These institutions are 
only concerned with the application and maintenance of 
the principle. They cannot alter its conditions. 
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Secondly, when a negotiator is formulating principles of 
justice, he cannot rely on the future choice of institu-
tions to reduce the inequalities allowed in terms of the 
difference principle. This would be irrational. The best 
and safest way to avoid these inequalities is to select a 
principle of justice that does not permit them. Rawls' 
second line of reasoning is unsatisfactory when viewed 
from the perspective of those behind the full veil of 
ignorance in the original position. 
As I mentioned earlier, chain-connectedness and 
close-knittedness are not a fundamental part of the argu-
ment for the difference principle. All the same, it would 
be very useful to show that one person's increase in 
expectations results in an increase for all. However, 
Kenneth Arrow demonstrates the fallibility of close-
knittedness: 
On the face of it, • [close-knittedne~sJ seems 
clearly false; there is nothing easier than to 
point out changes that benefit the well-off at the 
expense of the poor, including the least advantaged, 
e.g.,, simultaneous reduction of the income tax for 
high brackets and of welfare payments • • 37 
The least advantaged, then,,, cannot rely on the greater 
benefits of some eventually raising their expectations; 
they have to ensure that their own index of primary social 
goods is increased whenever the index of some other group 
is advanced. 
According to Thomas Nagel, the application of the 
difference principle will result in a society with 
meritocratic elements, although it will not rese~ble 
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Michael Young's meritocracy~ 3B In Rawls' view, a meri-
tocracy can come about when careers are open to talents but 
no attempt is made to alter a person's social and economic 
circumstances. The result is that " [e] quality of opp-
ortuni ty means an equal chance to leave the less fortunate 
behind in the personal quest for influence and social 
position." 39 The difference principle prevents this 
situation from arising in a Rawlsian society. Everyone's 
talents and abilities are regarded as part of a collective 
asset. Although Rawls' society is competitive, the 
competition is advantageous to all. Competitiveness need 
not be correlat~d with conflict; in Rawls' society, 
' competition and co-operation go hand in hand. 
Even though talents and abilities in general are 
used for everyone's benefit, the least advantaged can still 
complain that a system of unequal rewards discriminates 
against them. Nagel comments: 
If differentiated social and economic benefits are 
allowed to provid~ incentives, then the people at .the 
top will tend to be those with certain talents and 
abilities, and the people at the bottom, even though 
they are better off than they would be otherwise, 
will tend to lack these qualities. 40 
The system of rewards will ~ffect the least advantaged's 
sense of their worth. It is not a question of envying 
those who are better off. It is the realization that the 
more advantaged are in a better position beca~se they have 
superior talents, abilities and skills. The least 
advantaged's sense of their own worth will diminish if they 
are able to do very little to improve their situation and, 
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consequently, have to rely on others to raise their 
expectations. As the inequalities between the more and 
the least advantaged increase, so the worth of the latter 
is reduced. A person's self-respect does not depend 
solely on the liberties and opportunities that are made 
available to him. If we agree with Nozick that self-
respect is 'other dependent' and is based on criteria 
that differe~tiate between persons, then the least advan-
taged cannot have the same ~elf-respect as others if they 
select the difference principle. On these grounds it is 
irrational for the least advantaged to choose this prin-
ciple if they have to forego part of their share of the 
principal primary good. 
The unequal distribution of economic and social 
benefits affects the worst off person's ability to ex-
ercise his basic liberties and opportunities •. Norman 
Daniels illustrates how inequalities in liberty compound 
each other: 
For example, if the wealthy have greater liberty 
to affect the political process, then they may 
also acquire greater influence over the schools 
and what is taught in them. But the combined 
effects ~control over the schools and the media 
give the wealthy vastly greater 'freedom of 
expression' than those less well-off. In turn, 
their resulting influence over public information 
and training produces further increases in their 
political effectiveness. 41 
In cases like these the more advantaged are acting in 
accordance with the principles of justice. Their use 
of superior talents and abilities enables them to increase 
their wealth and powers. But as the disparities in 
social and economic benefits between the more and the 
least advantaged become greater, so the effectiveness of 
the basic liberties and opportunities of the least 
advantaged decrea5es. According to the difference prin-
ciple, inequalities can increase provided the expecta-
tions of the least advantaged are raised. So the least 
advantaged can be in a position where their index of 
primary social goods is advanced, yet they are becoming 
increasingly unable to exercise their liberties and 
opportunities effectively. 
We saw in the previous chapter that Rawls connects 
liberty and self-respect. The least advantaged will lose 
some measure of their self-respect, since they cannot 
make full use of their liberties. And in situations like 
this, they are fully entitled to envy the more fortunate 
persons. Rawls comments: 
A person's lesser position ~s measured by the index 
of objective primary goods may be so great as to 
wound his self-respect··. • When envy is a reaction 
to the loss of self-respect in circumstances where 
it would be unreasonable to expect someone to f~el 
differently, I shall say that it is excusable. 2 
As the negotiators must not promote envy and diminish 
their self-respect, they cannot choose a principle of 
justice that actually creates this situation. Once 
again, it is irrational for the least advantaged to 
select the difference principle. We have seen that this 
conclusion holds whether self-respect is based on liberty 
or on socio-economic status. 
If the difference principle provides no support 
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for the principles of liberty and fair quality of 
opportunity for the least advantaged, what principle 
should be chosen to regulate social and economic inequal-
ities? Since self-respect is the principal primary good, 
inequalities must be limited so that there is no diff-
erence between the self-respect of the more or the least 
disadvantaged. There are at least two possibilities. We 
can call these the 'strong' and 'weak' theses. 4 3 The 
strong thesis suggests that everyone's self-respect, 
basic liberties and opportunities (formal and effective) 
should be equal. This can only be achieved if social and 
economic benefits are distributed equally. We have 
returned to Rawls' starting point; that is, the 'bench-
mark of equality'. But this would provide very little 
incentive for those with superior talents and abilities. 
Would they be willing to improve the expectations of the 
least advantaged for little or no reward? 
The alternative is the weak thesis. Robert Amdur 
defines this as fo'llows: 11 [t] he weaker version would 
require only the elimination of inequalities that are 
great enough to cause major distortions in the political 
process." This falls somewhere between the 'benchmark 
of equality' and the difference principle. Admittedly, 
this is imprecise. But the intuitive idea is that the 
least advantaged must secure their self-respect and be 
able to make substantial use of their liberties and 
opportunities. Social and economic benefits are unequally 
distributed so that the efforts of the more advantaged 
raise the expectations of the least advantaged without 
reducing the latter's self-respect, basic liberties and 
opportunities. Social and economic inequalities are 
balanced against the ability to exercise liberties and 
opportunities. In other words, the least advantaged 
want to have the best of both worlds. 
The Perspective of the More Advantaged. 
When determining the arrangement of social and 
economic benefits, the negotiators only consider the 
interests of the least advantaged group. The expecta-
tions of the more advantaged are ignored. This is 
because 
• the person choosing has a conception of the 
good such that he cares very little, 'if anything, 
for what he ~ight gain above the mi~imum stipend 
that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the 
maximin rule. ~5 
At worst, a negotiato~ ca~ turn out to be a ~ember of 
the least advantaged group. Consequently, he can best 
advance his in6ex of primary social goods by maximizing 
the expectations of this group. But a negotiator still 
has to view the difference principle from the perspective 
of the more advantaged, even if, as Rawls suggests, he is 
not concerned with securing more than the minimum share of 
social and economic benefits. The successful application 
of the difference principle depends on the willing co-
operation of the more advantaged. They cannot be expected 
to comply with the conditions of the difference principle 
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if their rewards are outweighed by the sacrifices they 
make for the least advantaged. 
The difference principle can only be beneficial to 
both the least and the more advantaged, if the least 
advantaged are willing to co-operate with the more advan-
taged, and the more advantaged are willing to co-operate 
with the least advantaged. The situation is symmetrical. 
According to Nozick, we can imagine the least advantaged 
saying to the more advantaged: 
'Look, better endowed, you gain by cooperating with 
us. If you want our cooperation you'll have to 
accept reasonable terms. We suggest these terms:We'll 
cooperate with you only if we get as much as possible. 
That is,.the terms of our cooperation should give us 
that maximal share such that, if
4
tt was tried to give 
us more, we'd end up with less. 
But, in order for symmetry to exist, the more advantaged 
are entitled to say to the least advantaged: 
'Look worse endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. 
If you want our cooperation you'll have to accept 
reasonable terms. We propose these terms: We'll 
cooperate with you so long as we get as much as 
possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation 
should give us the maximal share such that, if it 4
7 was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less. 
The difference principle does no~ satisfy this condition 
since the more advantaged cannot increase their index of 
primary social goods unless they raise the expectations 
of the least advantaged. The maximal share, as Nozick 
describes it, cannot be attained. The onus is now on 
Rawls to show why the more advantaged should accept the 
terms of the difference principle. Two reasons are 
given. First ,, " it' is clear that the well-being 
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of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without 
which no one could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we 
can ask for the willing cooperation of everyone only if 
48 the terms of the scheme are reasonable." But, as 
Nozick rightly points out, neither of these reasons indicate 
why the more advantaged should be satisfied with the 
difference principle. Are the terms of the scheme reas-
on able? 
Peter Singer illustrates how the difference prin-
ciple can discriminate against the more advantaged: 
For instance, to put the matter in monetary terms, 
assume that a tax of 75 percent on all income over 
$15,000 would, after deducting administrative and 
other costs, allow welfare payments to the worst-
off group to be increased by only $1 per person 
per year. · The ~aximin rule would require that the 
tax be levied. 9 
When considering the strains of commitment, the negotiators 
will have to consider examples of this nature., In Chapter 
Two I stated that a negotiator assumes that h~, as well as 
everyone else, will abide by the chosen principles of 
justice. But the principles have to be formulated so that 
it is reasonable to expect everyone's compliance: 11 (t] hey 
cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences 
they cannot keep. • Thus the parties must weigh with 
care whether they will be able to stick by their commit-
ment in all circumstances." 50 (My emphasis.) It seems 
doubtful that the more advantaged can always adhere to the 
difference principle when their sacrifices often outweigh 
their rewards. It would even be irrational for the least 
advantaged to choose the\~ifference principle if they 
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know that the more advantaged cannot guarantee their co-
operation. 
We can come to the same conclusion by using a 
different line of reasoning. From their general informa-
tion, the negotiators know that the more advantaged persons 
in certain societies are unwilling to give up some of their 
advantages in order to raise the expectations of the least 
advantaged. Some Marxists believe that the least advan-
taged cannot rely on the willing co-operation of those 
who are better off. Instead, the worst off can only 
improve their lot by employing coercive means. Richard 
Miller comments: 
If Marxist theory is right, at least when applied 
to some societies, someone in the original position 
would forsee that the difference principle may be 
intolerable for him, if he turns out to be a typical 
member of the dominant exploitative class. 51 
The more advantaged cannot agree to the difference principle 
if they know, from the general information at .their disposal; 
that they are unlikely to adhere to it in all circumstances. 
Since the difference principle is unacceptable to 
the more advantaged, we must consider how they would 
decide to regulate social and economic benefits. Nozick 
argues that the more advantaged include those whose 
talents and skills are often used for the benefit of all. 
For instance, they are largely re~ponsible for technolo-
gical change, the development of management techniques 
and manufacturing methods' and so on. The least advan-
• 
taged benefit from all these ~dvances, and probably have 
more to gain from a system of social co-operation ' 
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than the more advantaged. Consequently, 
[w] hat does follow from . • [this] • • conclusion 
is a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of 
fairness, constraints upon voluntary social cooperation 
(and the set of holdings that arise from it) so that 
those already benefitting most from this general 
cooperation benefit even more~ 52 
The more advantaged believe that th.ere are no substantial 
reasons in favour of regulating social and economic 
inequalities. 
Summary. 
Neither the more advantaged nor the least advan-
taged are satisfied with the terms of the difference 
principle. The least advantaged object to the inequalities 
inherent in it. The disparities between the more and the 
least advantaged increase. Consequently, the difference 
principle reduces the effectiveness of the basic liberties 
and opportunities, as well as the self-respect, of those 
who are worst off. By contrast, the more advantaged 
object to the restrictions imposed on them by the diff-
erence principle. They believe that the egalitarian 
tendencies of th~ principle will prove to be fatal, as 
well as disadvantageous to all members of society. The 
least advantaged favour equality at the expense of liberty, 
while the more advantaged emphasize liberty rather than 
equality. No one principle of justice, 1designed to reg-
ulate social and economic inequallties, will be acceptable 
to both the more and the least advantaged groups. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 
In this, the final chapter, I wish to consider two 
of the more immediate problems that have to be overcome 
before Rawls' theory can be applied in any society. 
First, 4ow do we disting~ish between societie~ in 
favourable and unfavourable circumstances? Secondly, how 
does one compare and assess systems of liberty? In the 
last section, I shall discuss whether the principles of 
justice constitute a suitable standard for any society 
and every generation. 
Favourable and Unfavourable Circumstances. 
The general conception of justice is applied to 
societies in unfavourable circumstances, whereas the 
special conception pertains to these societies that are 
favourably situated. Before we can implement the theories 
of justice we have to decide whether a particular society 
is in favourable or unfavourable circumstances. Fav-
curable circumstances obtain when the worst off represen-
tative man's most urgent needs can be satisfied (the 
; 
date of economic adequacy). At this stage he is able to 
make use of his basic liberties artd consequently, the 
principles .of justice can be lexically ordered. 
The first priority is to define the least advan-
taged group itself. I mentioned in the previous chapter 
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that Rawls uses the criteria of income and wealth to 
differentiate between the various strata of society. 
According to Barber, these criteria are inadequate: 
• it can be doubted that crude indicators like 
income are sufficient to measure so complex a 
notion as justice, particularly in modern indus-
trial de~ocracies. In the United States recently, 
blacks, middle-class students, women, the rural 
poor, blue-collar workers and even the 'long-
suffering' middle class have vied with one another 
for the title 'least-advantaged'. 1 
Clearly, plural societies have more difficulty in iden-
tifying the least advantaged on the basis of income alone. 
For instance, is the wealthy African or the poor Indian 
part of the least advantaged group in South Africa? The 
culture and the social organization of societies also have 
to be taken into account. 
Once the least advantaged group is defined, we 
have to determine the level of economic adequacy for a 
society. Here again there is a difficulty. Brian Barry 
has used the aggregate national income of a society as 
one way of distinguish~ng between favourable and ~~fav-
bl . t 2 oura e circums ances. Japan, U.S.A., E.E.C. countries, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are favourably situated. 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia are rated as good poss-
ibilities, while U.S.S.R., Spain*, Argentina and South 
Africa are somewhat problematic. 
But gross national income by itself is inadequate 
for our purposes. Gross national product per capit~ is 
*However, Spain's political climate has changed 
considerably since the publication of Barry's book. 
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also misleading. Barry comments: 
It would not be valid to assume that two societies 
with the same average per capita income must have 
their 'worst-off representative man' at the same 
economic level. [T] here could presumably be 
technical and cultural factors which would make 
the same average compatible with a variety of very 
different minima. 3 
An individual's needs might be completely satisfied in an 
agrarian society with a subsistence economy. Yet it is 
quite possible for a person, who is employed, to lead an 
impoverished existence in a wealthy, industrialized 
society. We cannot establish a social minimum that is 
applicable to all societies. Each society has to be 
considered on its own merits. 
The inadequacy of using income and wealth as 
criteria for favourableness becomes apparent when we also 
take the conditions for the establishment of liberty into 
account. Barry comments: 
Is there anything in the material situation of, say, 
a group of nomadic Bedouin eking a bare existence 
from the desert or a population of poor peasant 
cultivators which would preven~ them from being 
able to use personal liberty? 
In a small agrarian society, persons could well be able to 
establish and maintain their basic liberties at a much 
lower standard of living than would be possible for 
individuals in industrialized countries. 
We therefore require an in-depth analysis of the 
social, political and economic structure of any society 
in order to determine whether favourable or unfavourable 
circumstances prevail. Perhaps one way of overcoming 
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this problem would be to compile a list of factors (for 
example, area and population density, agricultural and 
industrial shares of gross domestic product, food supply, 
literacy, scientific capacity, school enrollment ratios, 
and so on 5 ) so that an index of favourableness could be 
formulated. 
The Assessment of Liberty. 
The negotiators at either the consiitutional 
convention or the legislative assembly have to specify 
the extent of each basic liberty to prevent various liberties 
from conflicting with one another. Some liberties will be 
restricted for the sake of others 11 • so as to yield 
the best total system of equal basic liberty." 
6 
The 
negotiators determine the best arrangement of basic liberties 
for their society by assessing the different systems. There 
are two immediate problems. A negotiator has to be able to 
compare the extensions of different basic liberties.and to 
calculate the total amount of liberty for each system. 7 
I shall use three examples to illustrate the urgency of 
these problems. 
To simplify matters, I shall assume that a basic 
liberty in one system can be compared to the corresponding 
liberty in another; for example, freedom of speech in 
system 'X'. can be compared to freedom of speech in system 
I y I • I shall also assume that different basic liberties 
in various systems can be compared; for example, freedom 
of speech in system 'X' can be compared with freedom of 
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assembly in system 'Y'. Furthermore, each and every 
basic liberty can be calculated on the basis of a numerical 
scale (ranging from zero onwards). The higher the score, 
the more extensive the liberty. 
First of all, we can show that it is sometimes 
inadequate, or even misleading, to compare systems of 
liberty without contrasting their particular liberties. 
There are three systems in this example: X, Y,. Z. Each 
system has the same three liberties, namely, a, b, c . , for 
example, freedom of speech and assembly and the right to 
vote. The following scores were obtained: 
X: a= 1 b=5 Total=12 Average=4 
Y: a=6 b=6 Total= 12 Average=4 
Z: a= 10 b= 1 b=1 Total= 12 Average=4 
If we compare X, Y and Z by only referring to systems of 
liberty, as Rawls suggests, we can say very little about 
the merits or demerits of each arrangement. The total 
and average scores indicate that the systems are identical. 
But a completely different impression emerges when we 
examine the composition of each system. The balance of 
the liberties vary. In Z, freedom o~ speech is emphasized 
at the expense of freedom of assembly and the right to 
vote. By contrast, in X, freedom of assembly and the 
right to vote outweigh freedom of speech. How does a 
negotiator decide on the best arrangement for his society? 
More problems become apparent when we take the 
first example a step further. Consider two systems of 









There is no problem here at all; Mi~ preferable to N in 
all respects. But some persons may not be able to make 
effective use of their liberties. By taking effectiveness 
as well as the formal (or theoretical) value of l~berties 
into consideration, the following scores might now be 







We now see that N has more to offer than M, even though 
M originally appeared to be superior. When assessing 
systems of liberty, a negotiator has to consider the 
possible disparities between the definition of basic 
liberties and an individual's ability to exercise them. 
I am not suggesting that the above examples are 
indicative of how we assess liberties. But the negotiators 
can only apply the principle of liberty to their society 
if they have criteria for assessing particuLar liberties. 
Furthermore, these criteria ~re also nece~sary if we wish 
to determine whether societies have been successful in 
establishing a just system of liberty. 
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Limitations of the Principles. 
Generality and universality are two of the formal 
constraints of the concept of right. The principles of 
justice have to be general in form; that is, they must be 
formulated without any reference to proper names or any 
other personalized particular (See Chapter Two). Accord-
ing to Rawls, 
• first principles must be capable of serving 
as a public charter of a well-ordered society in 
perpetuity. Being unconditional, they always hold 
(under the circumstances of justice), and the know-
ledge of them must be open to individuals in any 
generation. 8 
The principles are universal in application; that is 
11 [tJ hey must hold for everyone in virtue of their being 
moral persons." 9 In short, the principles of justice 
apply to all societies and every generation. There are 
two questions here. First, ~e must ask whether these 
principles are in fact appropriate for all societies. 
Secondly, do all generations choose the same principles 
of justice? 
I shall use an example to illustrate the limita-
tions of Rawls' principles in certain contexts. The 
Yanomamo Indians of Southern Venezuela are one of the 
largest unacculturated tribes in South America. Their 
technology is primitive and their material culture is 
totally dependent on the resources of the jungle. Myths, 
legends, and their own particular cosmology form the 
basis of their intellectual environment. Each village 
is an ind~pendent social unit and the Yanomamo pay 
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particular attention to developing stable alliances with 
neighbouring villages. Chagnon comments: 
In summary, the Yanomamo have effected an adaptation 
to their three environments [that is, physical, 
sociopolitical and intellectua~. [E]ach 
individual Yanomano enters the world with the 
physical, social and ideological traditions at 
his disposal that will permit him to confront and 
adjust to the jungle, his neighbours, and the 
demons that cause sickness. 10 
In terms of economic adeqliacy, the Yanomamo society is in 
favourable circumstances. One cannot speak of a least 
advantaged group in this case, since all members of 
society have satisfied their most urgent needs. We now 
have to consider whether it would be possible to apply 
the principle• of liberty to such a society. 
The Yanomamo are known as 'the fierce p~ople'. 
They actually think of themselves in these terms, since 
one of their legends relates how they were originally 
born in blood. The males have a high capacity for rage 
and a willingness to use violence to achieve one's ends 
is a highly admired trait. Chagnon mentions that much of 
their behaviour can be described (from the point of view 
of Western civilization) as brutal, cruel and treacherous. 
The Yanomamo believe man is naturally ferocious arid 
consequently, they continually employ the politics of 
brinksmanship; the males continually goad one another in 
an attempt to establish the credibility of their threats. 
Wife-beating is an accepted practice among the Yanomamo. 
Women expect this treatment since the frequency of minor 
beatings indicates a husband's measure of concern. 
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Rawls' principles of justice would be thoroughly inapprop-
riate in the Yanomamo society. Self-respect is not obtained 
on the basis of liberty or socio-economic status. A 
male's self-respect depends on how fierce he is. The 
females are completely subservient to the males and 
Chagnon notes that as the women approach the age of thirty, 
they become cynic~l and seek consolation with one another. 
A woman's sense of worth is directly related to her 
inferior standing in the Yanomamo society. The Yanomamo 
warriors could not comply with a Rawlsian principle of 
liberty which does not discriminate between males and 
females. As the values and beliefs of the Yanomamo are 
so different to those of Western civilization, we cannot 
assess the justness of their society in terms of Rawls' 
principles. 
Even if one should apply the general rather than 
the special conception of justice to the Yanomamo society, 
the point still remains that, according to Rawls, all 
societies should regard the two main principles as part 
of a social ideal; their goal is to implement these 
principles at a time when favourable conditions prevail. 
Rawls' principles are not therefore appropriate for all 
societies. 
We can now consider the second problem: would all 
generations agree to the same two principles of justice? 
Steven Lukes has argued that Rawls' theory is an example 
of 'abstract individualism'. Lukes comments: 
According to this conception, individuals are 
pictured abstractly as given, with given 
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interests, wants, purposes, needs, etc; while 
society and the state are pictured as sets of 
actual or possible arrangements which respond 
more or less adequately to those individuals' 
requirements. 11 
Rawls has recently disagreed with this assessment of his 
theory, since 11 • the theory of a well-ordered society 
stresses that the interests and ends of individuals 
depend upon existing institutions and the principles o'f 
justice they satisfy." 12 (My emphasis.) All in all 
Rawls is claiming two things: (1) the negotiators base 
their choice of the principles of justice on current 
general information, and\ (2), these principles apply to 
all generations. Two problems arise. 
First, the negotiators' ~eneral informatioti will 
change over a period of time and radical develo~ments 
could prompt a reformul~tion of the prin~iples of justice. 
We can illustrate this. Rawls' difference principle is 
influenced by Pareto optimality. The negotiators select 
the maximin principle on the basis of present general 
facts and theories. It follows from Rawls' theory that 
a negotiator in the original position at the time of the 
tenth century would also choose the difference principle, 
in spite of the fact that the general knowledge of that 
time would not include Pareto's principle of efficiency. 
The principles of justice will only remain unaltered by 
the passage of time if our general facts and theories, 
as well as judgements, remain relatively fixed and static. 
Secondly, if the principles of justice change, 
those in different generations ~ay not agree on the terms 
11.5 
of social co-operation. Are those in a succeeding 
generation,who might choose different principles to the 
present generation, obliged to adhere to the principles 
that have already been established? Alternatively, are 
those in the present generation obliged to alter conditions 
so that the principles will secure the compliance of 
future generations? In spite of the motivational assump-
tiori in the original position and the choice of the just 
savings principle, Rawls has not solved the problem of 
justice between generations. 
These contlusions should not ~eem surprising. A 
particular conception of justice cannot be an acceptable 
staridard for all societies at all times. But these 
limitations do not affect the worth of Rawls' theory. As 
Philip Pettit comments: 11 in recent work on justice and 
morality, it is fair to say that we have had enough of 
universal theory. That is why Rawls's work i~ so interest-
ing and so challenging; it o;;ffers a particular theory of 
our sense of justice." 13 
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APPENDIX 
THE ORIGINAL POSITION AND OTHER SOCIETIES 1 
If we consider how the members of a society interact, 
as well ~s their attitudes, values~ judgements and knowledge, 
five assumptions about human nature can be stated: 
A(i) Some interaction 
A(ii) Some shared values 
B(i) Incomplete unselfishness 
B(ii) Fallible judgement 
B(iii) Imperfect information 
All five assumptions can be denied in two ways, 
pessimistically, in the 'e' form, and optimistically, in the 
'a' form: 
A(i)e No interaction A(i)a 
A(ii)e No shared values A(ii)a 
B(i)e No unselfishness B(i)a 
(total selfishness) 












B(iii)e No information B(iii)a Perfect information 
A number of communities, ideal or otherwise, can be 












four possibilities will be mentioned here: 
(1) Heaven :A(i), A(ii), B(i)a, B(ii)a, B(iii)a, 
(2) Kantian (or Hare-ian) 
society : A( i), A (ii) , B ( i), B(ii)a, B(iii)a, 
(J) Rawls' original 
position : A (i) , A(ii), B ( i) , B(ii)a, B(iii) 
(4) Actual human society :A(i), A(ii), B(i), B(ii), B(iii) 
I shall now attempt to justify my classification of 
the original position. It might seem surprising that the 
Kantian society and the original position are not identical, 
for Rawls often speaks of his theory as being based on a 
Kantian interpretation of a conception of justice. ~ More-
over, Lucas characterizes Kanti~n and Hare-ian societies 
as being one and the same. (Whether this is so, is a question 
I shall leave aside. For present purposes I assume Lucas' 
view to be correct.). The similarities between Rawls and 
Hare have been commented on by Barry, as well as by Hare 
himself. J (For differences between Rawls' and Hare's 
approach to morality, see David Richards, A Theory of Reasons 
for Action.)4 Nevertheless, I have decided to place the 
original position and Kantian or Hare-ian societies in 
different categories. 
Assumptions A(i) and A(ii) are essential for any 
communal co-existence whatsoever. Rawls acknowledges this 
in his account of the circumstances of justice: (the nego-
tiators, aware of the presence of these circumstances, 
realize that both a conflict and an identity of interests 
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between members of society are an inevitable part of the 
human condition. 
Those who believe Rawls' negotiators to be totally 
selfish, because the latter are only concerned to advance 
their index of primary goods as much as possible, will 
probably suggest that B(i)e, rather than B(i), would be 
more appropriate for the original position. Two reasons 
count against this. In the first place, a negotiator con-
siders not only himself, but also at least one member of the 
succeeding generation. Secondly, even if a negotiator strives 
to advance his own interests to the fullest possible extent, 
there is no reason to suggest why this should not be mot-
ivated as much by altruistic considerations as by selfish-
ness. (Both points were discussed more full.y in Ghapter 
Two.) So B(i)e is ruled out. As we cannot say negotiators 
never consider their own interests, B(i)a is equally 
implausible. Consequently, B(i) is closer to the mark for the 
original position. 
B(ii)a implies that the negotiators always make 
correct decisions. Infallibility, in Rawls' view, is assured 
by the rational assessment of information and argument in 
an original position that is fair. The original position 
is the key to the transition from B(ii), characteristic of 
an actual human society, to B(ii)a. Furthermore, the 
prospects of infallibility are enhanced by the method of 
reflective equilibrium which enables the negotiators to not 
only make decisions about various conceptions of justice, 
but also to test them. B(ii)a, 
\ 
then, accurately reflects 
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Rawls' intentions. 
The difference between the Kantian, or Hare-ian, 
society and the original position is their interpretation 
of B(iii). I shall not discuss whether.the Kantian and 
Hare-ian views are best described by B(iii)a. But it is 
important to see how the information available to Rawls' 
negotiators should be depicted in Lucas' scheme. Earlier 
we noted that, in order to create a situation of fairness 
in the initial situation, the negotiators are placed 
behind the veil -0f ignorance. In effect, they are denied 
certain kinds of knowledge. Consequently, they do not have 
perfect (in the sense of 'knowing everything there is to 
know') information at their disposal. Now on~ must be quite 
clear on this point. Because the negotiators are not made 
aware of every fact or theory, one cannot then argue that 
their information is either deficient or inaccurate. The 
correctness of the available knowledge is not questioned. 
In fact, this is partially accounted for by the require-
ments of B(ii)a. The relevance or adequateness ~f the 
information behind the veil of ignorance is not questioned 
here. (This was considered in Chapter Two.) All we are 
saying is that, if some knowledge is inadmissable in the 
original position, the negotiators do not have perfect 
information. On these grounds, the original position is 
more aptly characterized by B(iii). This conclusion 
should not be surprising for, on this score, it is identical 
to an actual human society. The negotiators' knowledge 
( B(iii) ) comes from general laws and theories based, to 
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to some extent, on the information available to those in 
actual societies ( B(iii) ) • Since the negotiators know 
less than members of actual societies, there would appear 
to be degrees of perfection, or imperfection, within the 
set of B(iii) itself. Certainly any theory, any amount of 
information, irrespective of its accuracy, which is derived 
from imperfect knowledge, characteristic .of actual societies, 
has to belong to the set of B(iii) assumptions. In fact, 
it is difficult to see how one could ever derive a B(~ii)a 
assumption from the set of B(iii). At any rate, one cannot 
do so in Rawls' case. 
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